

Expelling the Barbarian and the Last Stand: Examining the Newly Established Meiji Government's Reaction to Foreign Pressure and National Strife in 1868

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概要

本稿は日本の中での紛争や日本国外からの外圧という概念を考えながら攘夷論を検討し、明治新政府はどのような対応をしたのかを検討する。従って攘夷の運命を決めた三つの重大な事件が起こった明治時代の始まりを焦点とする。攘夷はどのように発展していったのか、どのようにテロの一種として使われたのか、そして結局どのように明治政府に鎮圧されたのかを理解するために1868年の背景を説明する必要がある。本稿は特に明治維新で活躍した人物の坂本龍馬（1835-1867）や中井弘（1838-1894）などの志士たちの役割を考察する。当時、日本国内の政治的な問題やその他の問題点、そして日本国内で認知された外国からの脅迫を述べた後更に、志士の思想の起点となった水戸学の影響を検討する。水戸学の思想を普及させたのは水戸藩の会沢正志斎（1781-1863）と藩主の徳川斉昭（1800-1860）だった。

攘夷の発展と終結の興味深いところは、最初に「攘夷」を信奉した志士たちがその後、新政府の指導者たちだったことである。以前尊重していた構想を排除するため、志士だった人物が新政府の指導者として日本国民のために新たな規則を定めた。日本政府のこのような新政策の最も意義深い転機と言えるのは1868年の始まりに起きた三つの重要な事件であり、その中に特に、縄手事件である。政策の転機は当時イギリスの公使だったハリー・パークス(1828-1885)の要求に大いに影響されたと言える。

本稿の目的はその三つの重要な事件に対する認識を高めることであり、特に現代の日本史研究やその他の歴史的な書物で忘れられている縄手事件の重要性を強調することである。特に本稿ではその三つの事件にかかわった人物に対しての認識を高めるつもりであり、その中、中井弘の行動を注目する。

キーワード：水戸学、神戸事件、堺事件、縄手事件、中井弘

Abstract

This paper will examine the concept of *jōi*, or ‘expelling the barbarian’, by first considering the internal struggles within Japan, as well as foreign pressure from outside powers, and finally look at how these issues were dealt with by the new Meiji government. The focus period of the paper, therefore, will be the beginning of the Meiji period, particularly the year 1868, when three key incidences decided the fate of *jōi*. It is necessary to explain the background to the events of 1868 in order to establish how *jōi* developed, was used as a form of terrorism, and how it was eventually stamped out by the new Meiji government. The paper, in particular, will consider the roles of the *shishi*, or ‘men of purpose’, such as Sakamoto Ryoma (1835–1867), Nakai Hiromu (1835–1894) and other key figures who worked toward the restoration of Imperial power. After an examination of the political and other internal problems as well as observing the perceived foreign threat, the paper will consider the influence of *Mito-gaku*, or, the Mito School of thought, which formed the basis of ideas among those ‘men of purpose’. Key characters that helped to propagate these ideas include Aizawa Seishisai (1781–1863) and Lord Tokugawa Nariaki (1800–1860) of the Mito domain.

The most intriguing element about the development and ultimate demise of *jōi* is the fact that many of those ‘men of purpose’ who had initially espoused the notion of ‘expelling the barbarians’ were the same men who later

took charge of the new government. As the new government leaders, they established new rules for the Japanese people to follow in order to eliminate the very concept they had once held in high esteem. The three key incidences, and particularly the Nawate Incident, of early 1868 can be described as perhaps the most significant turning point in this change of Japanese government policy. It may be said that such policy change was heavily affected by the demands of the then British Minister, Harry Parkes (1828–1885).

The purpose of this paper is to realise greater recognition for those three important incidences and particularly the last incident at Nawate because it is often completely overlooked in historical scholarly, and other forms of, literature. In particular, this paper is an attempt to draw more attention to the participants of those incidences, most notably, Nakai Hiromu.

Keywords: Mito Ideology, Kobe Incident, Sakai Incident, Nawate Incident, Nakai Hiromu

1. Introduction

On the 15th day of the eleventh month of Keio 3 in the old Japanese lunar calendar (December 10th, 1867 in the Western calendar), two men were attacked in an upstairs room of a soy sauce shop called Ōmiya in central Kyoto. Sakamoto Ryōma, a low ranking samurai from the Tosa domain (today's Kōchi Prefecture), was killed almost immediately; he was 33 years old. His friend and comrade, Nakaoka Shintarō (1838–1867), the son of a village headman, also from Tosa, lingered on for two more days; he was just 29 years old. Evidence of who the perpetrators of the assassination were is not clear, but the story of Sakamoto and Nakaoka's deaths is well-known to many of the Japanese population, young and old. They stood for something they believed was truly important, and they are now considered to be two of Japan's greatest national heroes, particularly Sakamoto. These two men were *shishi*, or, as the term has been translated, 'men of purpose'¹. Their 'purpose', initially, was *Sonnō Jōi* (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarian), a movement, which impacted the eventual collapse of the Tokugawa government and the restoration of Imperial rule in 1868.

Shishi were usually low-ranking samurai and '*rōnin*', or 'samurai without

a master'. Many of them had abandoned their home domains in order to fight in the name of the Emperor. Several historians have suggested that these men had become disappointed with the Tokugawa government system. They felt frustrated by the way their own local domain rulers, as well as the central Tokugawa government rulers, had been dealing with both Japan's internal strife and the pressures from other countries for Japan to open to trade. The historian Albert M. Craig, however, is disinclined to believe that this theory of the cause of the Restoration being disgruntled low-ranking samurai is the sole answer to the overthrow of the Tokugawa government. He argues,

During the fifties, in the United States as well as in Japan, the prevalent interpretation was that in the partially closed Tokugawa society, low-ranking men of ability had overthrown the Tokugawa regime because they were frustrated by their exclusion from high office and resentful of the privileges of inept men of high rank. Such negative sentiments doubtless existed, and should be considered as a part of any explanation, but a simple theory based solely on such sentiments, I came to feel, explained too little.²

Craig's point is a valid one. There was certainly negative sentiment among these men, but there was more to their sentiment than just envy of high rank and the privileged men who had it. These *shishi* were raised on, and influenced by, the prevalent thoughts which were rooted in *Mito-gaku*, or the Mito School/Ideology. These men rallied together under the cries of "*Sonnō Jōi!*" believing that the Emperor was the son of Heaven and thus the rightful ruler of Japan. They also believed that the foreign 'barbarians' had no right being in Japan, which to them was a 'Divine Realm'³. They therefore demanded, and fought for, the expulsion of all foreigners from Japanese shores. There are several cases of assassinations attributed to these men, both of Tokugawa leaders who supported the opening of Japan to foreign trade, and foreign residents within Japan. For the Tokugawa government, these men were what in modern terms might be considered 'terrorists'. However, it is also important to note that a number of these 'terrorists' later became heads of the new Meiji government that began in 1868. Upon visits to the 'Western

world', a proliferation of Western knowledge, and a realisation that the West could not be beaten without that knowledge, some of these 'men of purpose' had a change of heart.

This paper will look at under what influences the *shishi* came together, and how their beliefs and ideals shaped the development and eventual decline of the *Sonnō Jōi* Movement. For example, the role of the earlier noted Sakamoto Ryōma and his friend and comrade, Nakaoka Shintarō is important to this history. In some ways these two men, though they worked together a great deal, they had quite different approaches and ideas about how to deal with the problems they faced. Nakaoka was fairly mild in his ideas to begin with, but he became more militant and aggressive in his approach later. In contrast, although Sakamoto originally had a great hatred of foreigners, he later developed more temperate ideas. The historian, Marius Jansen points out that in a letter to his father when he was nineteen years old, Sakamoto wrote,

Since foreign ships have come to several places, I think there will be a war soon. If it comes to that you can be sure I will cut off a foreign head before coming home.⁴

Despite these strong patriotic words, Sakamoto later developed a more accepting stance. As his thoughts developed, he gradually came to the conclusion that it would be more beneficial to learn from the West and carry out trade relations with Western countries. His association with men such as the Tokugawa government official Katsu Kaishū is believed to have been a key influence in Sakamoto's change of heart. Katsu encouraged Sakamoto to round up many *rōnin*, or master-less samurai, these 'men of purpose', and help to train them in Western naval and navigation skills. Sakamoto's connection to Gotō Shōjirō, a retainer of Lord Yamauchi Toyoshige (also known as Yamauchi Yōdō, 1827–1872) of Sakamoto's own Tosa domain, as well as a samurai from the domain of Satsuma, Nakai Hiromu, was perhaps also influential to Sakamoto's development of ideas in creating a new Japan; ideas that encouraged trade with, and learning from, other nations. Sakamoto is known for bringing together a group of men who called themselves the *Kaientai*. The *Kaientai* established the beginnings of a trading company

based in Nagasaki called *Kameyama Shachū*. With his connections to fellow Tosa man, Iwasaki Yatarō (1835–1885), who later went on to establish the Mitsubishi *zaibatsu*, Sakamoto and his *Kaientai* members purchased Western ships for Japan, patrolled the Japanese coastline, and trained men in the Western art of navigation.

In a similar way to Sakamoto, Nakai Hiromu, a somewhat less well-known character in the history books, also originally had ideas of expelling the barbarians, but after visiting Britain in 1866–67, a move that is believed to have been encouraged by Sakamoto, he developed a more liberal approach to the foreign influx to Japan. Nakai is believed to have initially associated with the *Seichū-gumi*⁵, a group made up of men from Satsuma that had included such famous names as Saigo Takamori (1828–1877) and Ōkubo Toshimichi (1830–1878) who were loyal to the Emperor and wanted the complete expulsion of foreigners in Japan. Nakai's early days were very strongly connected with men whose ideas were on the side of the extreme. For example, Nakai is understood to have been associated with Ōhashi Totsuan (1816–1862)⁶ who, during what is known as the Sakashitamon Incident of 1862, was involved in the attempted murder of Andō Nobumasa, a *Rōjū*, or Council Elder, of the Tokugawa government who was in favour of *Kōbu Gattai*, or a 'Union of the Imperial Court and the Shogunate'. That incident had almost ended in a similar fate to the Sakuradamon Incident of 1860 in which the then *Rōjū*, Ii Naosuke had been murdered for accepting Commodore Perry's demands to open Japan for trade with the West. Also like Sakamoto, Nakai later befriended Gotō Shōjirō. The two became very closely connected, with Nakai even using the alias Gotō Kyūjirō at one point in his career. The pair also became key players in the Nawate Incident, which this paper will examine later in section 3.3.

In order to understand how the ideas of such patriotic men were formed, it is important to consider the historical background of the times, both prior to and, in which they lived. For some 250 years, Japan had been a largely isolated island terrain, out of the physical reach of most Western influence. The government was largely centralised and kept the Japanese citizens in check with various penalties for venturing away from the islands. No one,

under pain of death, was allowed to enter or leave the archipelago. Only the Dutch and Chinese had been allowed to trade at the sole port of Dejima, a small fan-shaped island off the mainland of Nagasaki. All other nations had been banned by the Tokugawa government in the early 1600s, for fear that they would try to influence the Japanese people with Christianity, and then try to take over the country. There was a genuine fear that if the Christians gained power in Japan, the ruling Tokugawa Shogun would have to answer to the Pope in Rome, as was the case with the leaders of European nations such as Spain and Portugal.

The Dutch had not brought any religious missionaries to Japan. They were there solely for trading relations. Holland was a protestant country, unlike the Catholic Spain and Portugal, so they were not really seen as a threat to power. In 1600, it was the Dutch ship, *De Liefde*, which first came to Japan for trading purposes. An Englishman by the name of William Adams (1564–1620), also known as Miura Anjin by the Japanese, was a pilot on board *De Liefde*, and because the Dutch captain of the ship, Jacob Quackernaeck happened to be too sick to move, the task of meeting the then Shogun, Tokugawa Ieyasu, was given to the relatively healthy Adams. This situation was to set the course of Dutch-Japanese relations as well as British-Japanese relations on a very specific path.

In 1609, the Dutch East India Company, or *Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (VOC), established a factory at Hirado, off the coast of Nagasaki thanks to the work of Adams and the crew of the ship, *De Liefde*. Also thanks to Adams, the English also established their factory at Hirado in 1613. However, the English business did not do well and the English left Japan of their own volition in 1623. The Dutch stayed and their factory was later moved to the island of Dejima in 1641. William Adams died in 1620 and Tokugawa Ieyasu died in 1616. Ieyasu had only served as Shogun from 1603 to 1605. Ieyasu's third son, Tokugawa Hidetada was the ruling Shogun from 1605 to 1623, the same year the English left. Following Hidetada as Shogun was Tokugawa Iemitsu, Hidetada's first son and Ieyasu's grandson. Both Hidetada and Iemitsu were less enthusiastic about trade with other nations, and by Iemitsu's time, the ban on Japanese leaving or returning to Japan, and

other nationalities (except the Dutch and the Chinese at Dejima) entering into Japan were thoroughly set. Japan's foreign policy was to remain in this situation until the early 1850s when the American Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry (1794–1858) came demanding the Japanese archipelago open up to foreign trade.

During this period, Edo culture flourished, but now that Japan was united under one government, the Tokugawa Bakufu, there was no longer a great need for warriors. The samurai class remained, but their occupations became closer to that of administrators rather than fighting men, and they received stipends in the form of rice. The rice crop failures and subsequent famines that blighted the early 1800s, on top of the deterioration of Tokugawa government's quality of leadership, were just a part of the growing problems that Japan was facing. The following section 2 of the paper will examine those internal and external elements of the Japanese nation's troubles, as well as look at the philosophical ideas that developed in response to those troubles.

2. Internal Struggle, External Pressure and the Influence of Thought

This section of the paper will examine the two key elements which the Tokugawa government struggled with in order to maintain its power and which it eventually lost its battle against. That is, firstly the section will look at the country's internal struggles: the peasant uprisings and resulting internal political instability. Then secondly, it will consider the pressures the country faced from external sources; i.e. the potential threat of foreign invasion.

Finally, this section will consider the development among the samurai of new ideas and thought, which came about as a response to the troubles, but also which led to their reactions toward the political issues and the pressure from foreign countries.

2.1 Peasant Uprisings and Political Instability

Early on in Japan's period of self-imposed, partial isolation, the country

had flourished economically. Many castle towns had been built up, and relatively speaking, the country was peaceful to begin with. From the 1600s onwards, the samurai had no real need to fight any longer since the country had been unified by the three famous warlords: Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582), Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536[?]-1598) and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543–1616) and now the Tokugawa clan controlled the country from Edo. The Tokugawa kept any rebellious *daimyo* lords in check with systems such as *sankin kōtai* in which in alternating years the lords were required to attend Court at Edo, and then leave their family members as hostages in Edo while they were at their own domains. Rather than fighting, the samurai turned to other pursuits such as studying. Many became intellectuals and administrators for the Tokugawa government and a clear hierarchy of office was established. Nevertheless, despite initial relative peace, there developed a gradual unrest among some of the people. In the 1830s, rice crop failures caused famines and this caused economic problems for many domains as well as the central Tokugawa government. In addition, many samurai became dissatisfied with their low wages, which were given to them in rice stipends. When rice crops failed, the situation became even more problematic. The Tokugawa government's mismanagement of these issues resulted in a number of peasant and samurai rebellions. One well-known example of such rebellions occurred in 1837 when an insurrection came about led by the samurai and government administrator, Ōshio Heihachirō (1793–1837) in Osaka. Ōshio was a Neo-Confucian scholar, and his work as a Tokugawa government administrator was a point which makes his leadership in the rebellion all the more poignant.

The Tokugawa government attempted to deal with these problems of unrest with a set of measures called the “Tenpō Reforms” (Tenpō being the era name when the reforms were created, 1830–1844) in the 1840s. However, these reforms were wanting when it came to being effective measures to distil the troubles. The reforms merely demonstrated just how much the government had become incapable and out-of-date as an institution. The Tenpō Reforms were really only a revamped version of reforms that had been carried out in the past. In other words, there was nothing really new about them, and therefore, as in the case of previous attempts at reform, they were not very

effective in the long run.

In Jansen's *The Emergence of Meiji Japan* (1995) discussion of three periods of reform are raised: Tokugawa Yoshimune's Kyōhō era (1716–36) reform programme, Matsudaira Sadanobu's Kansei era (1789–1801) reforms, and Mizuno Tadakuni's Tenpō era reforms. It is the Tenpō reforms that most closely connect with, and affect the later Meiji years. Nevertheless, the two former reform eras are also important as they are the foundations the Tenpō reforms later built upon. In basic terms, in each reform era, the Tokugawa government simply attempted to control the people with varying methods of austerity. For example, how they dressed was controlled. Lower classes of society such as peasants were not allowed to wear brightly coloured clothing, or expensive fabrics, or carry umbrellas in the rain.

While samurai were becoming poorer due to famine and low stipends, merchants were becoming richer and some were able to buy samurai status. Corruption in government and society in general was becoming relatively commonplace and scholarly social critics like Rai Sanyō (1780–1832), who wrote *Nihon Gaishi* (Unofficial History of Japan) and presented it to Matsudaira Sadanobu in 1827, began to write about the problems within the Shogunate regime and society. Rai was another whose writing inspired the later loyalist 'men of purpose'.

As in Jansen's example noted above, much has been written on the subject of such internal struggles and political instability within Japan during this period in both Japanese and English, and the scope of this paper unfortunately does not allow for further reiteration of what has already been said. Nevertheless, in order to establish clarity about the background of 1868, it is important to be aware of these issues. Other useful sources on the topic are not difficult to find in works on Japanese history. For example, *The Cambridge History of Japan Volume 5 The Nineteenth Century*⁷ gives extensive coverage on the Tenpō era and the reforms made by the Tokugawa leaders.

2.2 The Foreign Threat

For Japan, aside from the internal problems it had, there was growing

pressure from outside for Japan to become a more open nation and communicate and trade with other nations. Initially, the foreign threat was seen as worrisome to the ruling Tokugawa government because they were afraid of losing their control of Japan. As has already been noted, the Tokugawa government feared the power of Christianity, and naturally as an extension of that the power of the Catholic Pope. In addition to this nervousness regarding religion, the Tokugawa were also wary of expanding Western empires, in particular, the British. From the period of the early 1840s, Japan had received word about British activities in China regarding the Opium Wars, and the Japanese authorities were very concerned about similar attacks happening to Japan.

In addition to Japan's internal struggles and weakening, old government regime, the pressure from other nations for Japan to open its doors to foreign trade was becoming increasingly intense. Incidences of foreign ships entering into Japanese waters had been occurring ever since Japan was officially closed off to foreign ships. The Takarajima Incident of 1824, which will briefly be discussed later in section 2.3, is just one example. Dejima Island, off the coast of Nagasaki, was the only port where foreign vessels were allowed to dock and that access was limited to Chinese and Dutch ships. Despite this, foreign ships, whaling ships and others, often frequented the seas nearby. Finally, in the summer of 1853, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry arrived at Japan's shores with demands for Japan to open to the Western world. The Tokugawa government went into panic, unable to take any decisive action. Perry told the Japanese that he would return the following year, 1854, expecting a positive response. The Tokugawa government, at a loss, proceeded to demonstrate just how weak an organization they had become by consulting all the feudal lords, or *daimyō*, of each domain for advice on how to deal with this new foreign threat. This move was unprecedented and the many different lords gave a relatively mixed response. However, the general mood was to keep the foreign barbarians out and maintain the *status quo*. This however, the Tokugawa government was gradually coming to realise, would be impractical.

A number of domain lords also were very aware of the impracticality

of continuing to block relations with other nations. One good example of such a domain was Satsuma, on the southern island of Kyūshū, the castle town of which and seat of the domain lord and his family, Shimazu, was Kagoshima. Satsuma, being placed in charge of dealings with the Ryūkyū Islands had more opportunity to connect with other nations well before Perry arrived. They had had some trade, albeit surreptitiously, with China. From an early period they had access to information about the Opium wars and the activities of Britain and other nations around Asian waters. The lord of Satsuma, Shimazu Nariakira, who was very keen on Western learning, had spent a great deal of time, money and effort from the early 1850s developing the education of the Satsuma samurai and building up what became known as the Shūseikan, a Western-style industrial enterprise. This was a complex of buildings where Western technology such as textile-making, steel production and other products were recreated and several innovations were developed. One example was the development of the Satsuma glassware known as *Satsuma Kiriko*, the skills of which had originally been brought to Satsuma from craftsmen of *Edo Kiriko* (Edo being present-day Tokyo). Satsuma was later involved in the Kagoshima Bombardment of 1863, which happened as a result of the Namamugi Incident of 1862, and some of the guns used by Satsuma in their battle against the British had been made with knowledge developed at the Shūseikan. The complex still exists as a museum has many visitors today as one of Kagoshima's popular tourist spots.

Despite the preparations of some domains, however, for the most part, Japan was not well-prepared to protect itself against foreign invasion. The internal struggle within Japan and the foreign threat from nations outside Japan, in the words of Harold Bolitho (1995), "... brought on a crisis without parallel in Tokugawa history, shaking society to its very foundations."⁸ The end was nigh for the Tokugawa government who were no longer adequately equipped to deal with the amount of difficulties it was faced with. The perceived foreign threat to her shores was one that, despite the warnings from various scholars and other social commentators, Japan and the Japanese were simply not ready for. The following section of the paper will consider some of these warnings and the men who propagated them.

2.3 Nineteenth Century Japanese Thought and the Prevalence of Mito School Ideals

The theory of *Jōi*, or “Expelling the Barbarian” can be traced to the Mito School of ideas. J. Victor Koschmann’s *The Mito Ideology* (1987) may be called one of the seminal works on the subject available in English. Another writer, Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi has also written an extensive work on the subject of Mito scholar, Aizawa Seishisai, which includes an English translation of Aizawa’s *New Theses* in which the ideas for *Jōi* are clearly visible⁹. Wakabayashi stresses the importance of his English translation of the work,

New Theses has immense significance as a historical document because it roused late Tokugawa *shishi* to violent action; they did not hurl it aside in disgust because it was boring. The historical significance of the work warrants making it accessible to Western readers¹⁰.

However, Koschmann suggests that the Mito theorists did not necessarily bring about the turmoil of the Restoration years but that their texts were given new meaning. He says,

... rather than “causing” the Meiji Restoration, or “influencing” those who did, Mito simply offered its texts to be read and its meaningful actions to be reenacted (*sic*) by others, thereby giving them new importance beyond their original contextual relevance.¹¹

Certainly Aizawa never intended for a Restoration or abandoning the Shogunate; he merely wanted an improvement of the Tokugawa system. Nevertheless, his written works were key in the development of ideas among those ‘men of purpose’. Therefore, knowledge of Aizawa’s work is vital in order to grasp an understanding of the Mito Ideology and this section will explain some details about that publication. First, however, a brief look at who Aizawa and the then Lord of Mito, Tokugawa Nariaki were will be given, in order to grasp an understanding of how the Aizawa text became prevalent.

Aizawa Seishisai, also known as Aizawa Yasushi, was born in the domain

of Mito in 1781, now part of Ibaraki Prefecture. Aizawa studied under the noted Mito scholar Fujita Yūkoku (1774–1826), originally the son of a second-hand clothing merchant¹². In the foreword to his translation of *Shinron*, Wakabayashi explains that due to both men coming from a low ranking social status, in theory, neither of them were allowed to participate in domain government policy-making.¹³ However, Aizawa managed to gain a close connection to the Lord of Mito, Tokugawa Nariaki, and it was Nariaki that allowed Aizawa’s *Shinron* to spread to a wider audience. Wakabayashi notes that it became “a virtual bible to activists in the ‘revere the Emperor, expel the barbarian’ movement”.¹⁴ Originally, *Shinron* had been written in Classical Chinese but it was rendered into the Japanese language later on in the 1850s thus allowing a much broader readership.¹⁵

Tokugawa Nariaki, unlike his predecessor, was more sympathetic to the Mito Ideology cause. Nariaki was born in 1800. He became the ninth lord of the Mito domain in 1829. He advised the Tokugawa Bakufu on issues of national defence and strongly urged the expansion of Japan’s military defences. Nariaki also expanded the Mito education system, which had originally been established by Tokugawa Mitsukuni, or as he is otherwise known, Mitō Kōmon (1628–1701). Mitsukuni has also been in charge of organising scholars of Mito to compile *Dai Nihon-shi*, or the *Great History of Japan*, which many samurai later went on to study, including Nariaki himself. Heavily influenced by Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, that publication established the roots of *kokugaku*, or what may be termed “Native Studies”; in other words, “Japanese Studies” as opposed to *Kangaku*, or “Chinese Studies”. Thus, the beginnings of Mito Ideology were becoming established. This paper places focus on Aizawa’s *Shinron*, but there are numerous other scholars who were involved in the spread of these ideas. Fujita Tōkō (1806–1855) and Toyoda Tenkō (1805–1864) are examples of just two other famous names.

New Theses, or *Shinron* (新論), was published in 1825, the same year the Tokugawa government had issued its Expulsion Edict to repel foreign vessels from Japan’s shores (異国船打払令, *Ikokusen Uchiharai-rei*). In the previous year, 1824, there had been an incident at the island of Takarajima,

off the coast of Kagoshima, in which a British ship appeared, the crew of which landed on the island demanding supplies. The exchange began as a friendly one; island officials allowed a number of men to land and goods were exchanged. However, difficulties began when the English sailors began making demands for some black bulls they had spotted because they wanted the meat. The Japanese islanders refused and the Englishmen returned to their ship, but instead of sailing off, they lingered in the port, and that evening some Englishmen returned to the island to try and take some of the bulls. They were caught out and a skirmish with the island officials ensued, but in the chaos one of the Englishmen was shot dead. The Takarajima incident was just one of several incidents which encouraged the Tokugawa government to strengthen their laws on not allowing foreign influx to Japan. For Aizawa Seishisai and many other Japanese of the time, the increasing number of foreign ships appearing in Japanese waters was extremely alarming. The British, in particular, were seen as pirates, and even in the present day, on Takarajima Island, there is a hill slope called *Igrisu-zaka*, or, the English Hill, to remind the locals of the terror of the Takarajima Incident.

To get some idea of the kind of language Aizawa used, the following are a selection of quotes from the text as translated by Wakabayashi. Aizawa starts his *Shinron* text with strong, bold words that set the tone to make it immediately clear to his readers that Japan and the Japanese people are a superior set of beings above the rest of the world,

Our Divine Realm is where the sun emerges. It is the source of the primordial vital force (*yuan ch'i*) sustaining all life and order. Our Emperors, descendants of the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu, have acceded to the Imperial Throne in each and every generation, a unique fact that will never change. Our Divine Realm rightly constitutes the head and shoulders of the world and controls all nations.¹⁶

Regarding Western invasion, and making his stance on Western peoples in general, Aizawa warns the Japanese people of the situation as he sees it especially those who live in coastal areas,

[Unless appropriate steps are taken] all people in coastal regions will

flee for the hills under enemy assaults. The barbarian dogs and goats would trample us underfoot, and nothing could save us.¹⁷

The Westerners are clearly not even deemed human by Aizawa. His disdain for Western peoples goes to the level of name calling and abusive terms in describing them. Wakabayashi, in his explanation of the Aizawa text also makes note of this point,

Aizawa, too, denigrated Westerners, calling them “stupid barbarians,” “dogs and goats,” and other like names. But such blustering and vilification should not obscure the fact that he took their threat in dead earnest.¹⁸

Certainly, for Aizawa and many other Japanese, the threat was indeed very real. For several hundred years the Japanese had been very cautious about allowing Christianity to spread in Japan and here also Wakabayashi goes on to explain,

Aizawa asserted the need for a consistent, sustained program of religious and cultural “counter-transformation” supplemented by armed might.¹⁹

Indeed, even when the Satsuma samurai Nakai Hiromu later travelled to Britain in 1866, he wrote in his journal about the need for the Japanese people to be clear about their own religion, and he raises Shinto as the rightful religion for the Japanese people.²⁰ It is not absolutely clear whether Nakai read Aizawa’s text, but the influence of *Shinron* was already widely spread by 1866. Koschmann explains that,

It is indisputable that many of the individuals who led the anti-bakufu movement had gone through some sort of “Mito experience”. Maki Izumi (1813–1864), Yoshida Shōin (1830–1859), Kusaka Gensui (1840–1864), and Umeda Unpin (1815–1859) all went to Mito at least once between the mid-1840s and early 1860s and left evidence of having read and pondered major works by Mito ideologues. Yoshida, particularly stayed in Mito for a full month late in 1851 and early 1852, and spent time with Aizawa, Toyota (*sic*) Tenkō (1805–1864), and other

Mito personalities.²¹

Certainly, it is indisputable that many read the Aizawa text among others from the Mito ideology ilk, and even where some samurai and others who were involved in the Meiji restoration did not actually read the texts themselves, the influence of those who had, spread across all levels of society. Then, when the Westerners began to come into Japan after the signing of the Ansei Treaties (1854–58), the amount of fear toward them can be seen in the growing number of attacks made on them in those early years. The same is true of attacks made on Japanese who were in favour of opening Japan to the West; the murder of Ii Naosuke, who made the decision to sign the Ansei Treaties, being one example.

In November 1864, two British officers, Major George Walter Baldwin and Lieutenant Robert Nichols Bird of the 20th regiment, were murdered in Wakamiya Oji in Kamakura in what is now Kanagawa Prefecture by samurai “men of purpose” who wanted to see the foreigners out of Japan. Shimizu Seiji, the key perpetrator in the incident, was beheaded and his head was then publicly displayed for three days. Despite his treatment as a criminal, to many Japanese he was seen as a hero doing his duty to his country.

Yamada Masaru argues, however, that in some cases, the men who carried out these attacks were not necessarily doing it because of their beliefs but because they wanted the prestige and hoped for the opportunity to find work.²² This may be true in some cases, but to many Japanese at the time, the more dead foreigners, the better. Many attacks were made on foreign nationals: Henry Heusken, the Dutch-American interpreter for the American Consulate was murdered in 1861. Charles Lennox Richardson was murdered in the Namamugi Incident in 1862. Other unsuccessful attempts to kill a member of the foreign community also occurred; the arson attack on the British Legation at Tōzenji being one example in which British legation secretary Laurence Oliphant (1829–1888) was badly injured. Whatever the reasons behind the attacks, however, the foreign community members were obviously not content with the constant possibility of being murdered.

The following section 3 of the paper will examine three key incidences

that occurred in 1868 that affected the Meiji government's decision-making policies in dealing with issues regarding foreign diplomacy. The foreign community had had enough and by 1868 they began to put pressure on the Japanese government to curb these incidences of terrorism.

3. The Last Stand: Three Key Incidences of *Jōi* in 1868 and the Significance of Nawate

At the beginning of 1868, three important incidences occurred. These three incidences can be considered incidences of *Jōi* which heavily affected the decision-making among members of the new Meiji government toward Japan's foreign policy.

Each of these three incidences play an important part in policy decision making, but it is the last incident, the Nawate Incident, and the resulting responses from the British side, which firmly set the tone for future diplomatic relations and seemingly placed an official stop on further attempts to 'expel the barbarians'.

3.1 The Kobe Incident

The first of these three incidences was the Kobe Incident, also known as the Bizen Affair, which occurred on the eleventh day of the first month of the fourth year of Keio²³. In Western calendar dating that was February 4th, 1868. To this day, the site of the incident is indicated by a commemorative stone marker, which can be seen in Kobe city outside Sannomiya Shrine. Soldiers from the domain of Bizen (present-day Okayama) fired upon the crew members of foreign ships that were docked in the port, which had only recently been opened to trade with the West. Apparently unaware that it was a criminal offence to cut across the path of a domain lord's guard procession; the foreign sailors were duly attacked by the Bizen guards. Ernest Satow explains that it was an American soldier²⁴ who had initially crossed the path of the procession, but in fact it is understood to have been a French sailor. Nevertheless, what then proceeded was according to Satow, an attempt on "the life of every foreigner who they met, but without serious consequences"²⁵.

Afterwards, the Governor General of the new Meiji government's Foreign Department, Higashikuze Michitomi (1834–1912) went to make negotiations on how to deal with the attack. It was decided that Taki Zenzaburō, who had given orders to fire on the foreign sailors should take responsibility and he was to do this by taking his own life.

The resulting *seppuku* of Taki Zenzaburō was the first to be witnessed by foreign representatives. An account of Taki's *seppuku* was made by Algernon Bertram Mitford (1837–1916), one of the secretaries to the British minister, Harry Parkes. Mitford wrote an article about the *seppuku* ceremony, which was published in the British press and later formed part of Mitford's 1871 publication, *Tales of Old Japan*. Of the incident and Taki's subsequent death, Mitford says,

The offence—an attack upon the flags and subjects of all the Treaty Powers, which lack of skill, not of will, alone prevented from ending in a universal massacre—was the gravest that has been committed upon foreigners since their residence in Japan. Death was undoubtedly deserved, and the form chosen was in Japanese eyes merciful and yet judicial. The crime might have involved war and cost hundreds of lives; it was wiped out by one death.²⁶

Ernest Satow (1843–1929), a British Legation secretary at the time, also wrote of his ideas on how he thought the outcome of the Kobe Incident should play out in his *A Diplomat in Japan*,

I proposed to Sir Harry that we should issue a manifesto declaring that if Bizen's people did not satisfactorily explain their behaviour, the foreign powers would make it a quarrel with Japan as a whole.²⁷

From Satow's quote, it is clear that tensions between the foreign community and the Japanese were rising. Mitford also notes in the preceding quote that there might have been the possibility for all-out war. Indeed, representatives of the foreign community even went as far as posting public notices in Japanese throughout the areas of Hyōgo, Osaka and other parts of the country. The first point on these notices read:

To-day, as Ikida (*sic*) Isé and Hikei Tade Ware, retainers of Matsdaira Bezen No Kami, were passing through the town of Kobé, their followers, without provocation, attacked and wounded foreigners with spears and fire-arms. You must immediately come forward and explain this matter. If full reparation be not given, it will be assumed that you are the enemy of foreign nations, who will take measures to punish this outrage. It must be borne in mind that this matter will then concern not only the Bizen clan, but may also cause grave trouble to the whole of Japan.

This declaration is made by all the foreign representatives.

Hiogo, *February* 4, 1868.²⁸

Fortunately however, Parkes and other leading representatives eventually became more thoughtful about how they should respond. The death of Taki was what both the Japanese and foreign representatives believed would be enough to allow the high tensions to subside.

In its origins, the Kobe Incident is not unlike the Namamugi Incident, or Richardson Affair, that occurred on September 14th, 1862. In that incident, a small group of four British merchants who were travelling along the Tokaido route on a day trip came across the retinue of the Satsuma lord, Shimazu Hisamitsu, and because they did not get down from their horses as they were told, one of them, Richardson was killed.

The difference, however, between the Kobe Incident and the Namamugi Incident is the manner in which the incidents were dealt with by the authorities. Nobody in the Namamugi Incident was brought forward to take responsibility for Richardson's death. Yano Tsuneo also points out²⁹ that the Japanese authorities did not want a repeat of the Kagoshima Bombardment (Anglo-Satsuma War), which had come about as a result of the Namamugi Incident. The fear of the possibility of war caused the newly established Meiji government to act in a more decisive manner. They would placate the foreign representatives with Taki's self-disembowelment. However, such a ceremonial death was still considered honourable, the death of a samurai. Mitford's now famous piece about the honourable suicide was a grotesquely romantic depiction, which left a great impression on Westerners who came

to Japan later on. They saw the legendary samurai as heroic protectors of their homeland. The reality for those who experienced the actual threat of attack was perhaps somewhat of a less romantic and more terror-inciting experience, however. On the Japanese side too, Taki became a hero, a martyr, dying for his country by taking responsibility for the incident. His ceremonial death was one of great honour, and he was not, in Japanese eyes, seen as a criminal but a martyr for the cause. This reality did not dawn on the foreign representatives until later on as this paper will show.

3.2 The Sakai Incident

The second incident is known as the Sakai Incident, and this occurred just over a month later on March 8th in the Western calendar. In the Japanese calendar, that was the 15th day of the second month in the fourth year of Keio (or the first year of Meiji). In this incident, samurai from the domain of Tosa who were patrolling the port of Sakai in Osaka attacked and killed eleven French sailors from the ship, *Dupliex*. Japanese Foreign Department officials, Nakai Hiromu, Godai Tomoatsu (1836–1885, Godai later became a leading businessman and established the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and the Osaka Stock Exchange) and another colleague, had the gruesome task of retrieving the bodies from the sea and making a record for the Japanese government's official reports regarding the type of wounds each sailor had.³⁰

Harry Parkes, the British minister made his thoughts known to the Japanese Foreign Department officials, Higashikuze Michitomi and Date Munenari (1818–1892, originally the Lord of the Uwajima domain; in present-day Ehime prefecture) by writing to them on March 12th, just four days after the incident. In his letter he expresses his indignation,

Their Excellencies are aware of the indignation felt by the Undersigned in common with his colleagues the Representatives of the Foreign Powers then in Osaka, when they heard, at one o'clock, on the morning of the 9th instant, that the crew of a steam launch belonging to a French Ship of War had been barbarously murdered at Sakai the previous afternoon. That feeling unfortunately was not lessened when, after a delay of ten hours, and eighteen from the time of the murder,

the account given by Their Excellencies to the Foreign Representatives proved utterly untrue, and no information was furnished respecting the missing men.

Under such circumstances, the Undersigned felt bound to withdraw together with the other Representatives from Osaka, to mark his abhorrence of the horrible crime, and his disapproval of the way in which it had till then been dealt with by the Mikado's Government.³¹

Harry Parkes' letter is very strongly worded and no doubt came across to the Japanese as very threatening. He continues his threats in his angry tones,

The Undersigned ... hastens to urge the Mikado's Government to comply with ... as little delay as possible. It is of the highest importance that the Mikado's Government should prove by the promptness with which complete redress is rendered in this case that they will not suffer the name of the Mikado to be disgraced by such abominable acts, and that his Majesty has power to suppress them. It is only by such a course that the Government of the Mikado can expect to receive the respect of foreign nations.³²

Clearly, Parkes is developing a clever way of coercing the Japanese government to respond in the manner he deems suitable by using the name of the Japanese Emperor and suggesting that these incidents are shedding a poor light on both the Emperor and his government. If Japan wants respect on the world stage he suggests that they "comply" with the British representatives demands.

Regarding the Sakai Incident, the British Legation secretary Ernest Satow explains the confusion over the bodies of the missing men,

The dead bodies of the seven missing French sailors having been found, Daté and Higashi-Kuzé went on board the French flagship "Vénus" to inform M. Roches. But by some curious blunder the boxes containing the corpses were first sent to the British transport "Adventure," where they were mistaken for cases of "curios" belonging to our Legation, and how the discovery was made of the real nature of

the contents I never heard, but they did not arrive at the French flagship till late in the afternoon.³³

Satow also notes, “It was evident to everybody that the execution of the Bizen officer [Taki Zenzaburō] had not had the effect of a warning.”³⁴ It is clear from this quote that some members of the foreign community were not happy with the method the Kobe Incident had been dealt with. The organisation of the Meiji government was bad enough, but Taki’s death had clearly not been a strong enough deterrent to prevent further attacks. Taki had been given an honourable death by being allowed to commit *seppuku* like a true samurai. His was not the death of a criminal. However, Satow also gives an indication of the British Minister, Harry Parkes’ thoughts on the Sakai incident, “In Sir Harry’s own opinion a large number of the Tosa men ought to suffer death, but he did not approve of pecuniary indemnities.”³⁵ Although Satow does not tell his readers why Parkes does not see a necessity for monetary compensation, this comment may provide a clue to the ideas that appears to be forming in Parkes’ mind regarding how to deal with attacks on foreign community members in future to absolutely ensure that they would not occur again. In examining the next incident, the Nawate Incident, Parkes’ reactions and the Japanese responses to him seem to change the way the foreign community and the Japanese policymakers interact on a greater scale.

3.3 The Nawate Incident and the End of the *Jōi* Movement?

The Nawate Incident occurred on March 23rd, 1868. In the Japanese calendar, that was the 30th day of the second month in the fourth year of Keio (or the first year of Meiji). The then British Minister representing her Majesty Queen Victoria’s government, Harry Smith Parkes and his entourage were on their way to conduct an official visit to his Imperial Majesty the Emperor Meiji for the first time. The meeting had been arranged earlier and it included the Emperor’s first meeting with the Dutch and French Ministers also. Governors on the Japanese side had spent many weeks preparing for the meeting.

Ernest Mason Satow, who was accompanying the British minister,

recorded his recollections of the incident in his 1921 publication, *A Diplomat in Japan*,

“It was arranged that we should start from Chi-on-in for the palace at one o’ clock on March 23. The procession was to be headed by the mounted escort, led by Inspector Peacock and Nakai, then Sir Harry and Goto, myself and Lieutenant Bradshaw, the detachment of the 2/ix, followed by Willis, J. J. Enslie, Mitford in a palanquin (being unable to ride) and five naval officers who had come up with us. We descended the whole length of the street called Nawate opposite to the main gate of Chi-on-in, but just as the last file of the mounted escort turned the corner to the right, a couple of men sprang out from opposite sides of the street, drew their swords, and attacked the men and horses, running down the line and hacking wildly. Nakai observing what was passing jumped down from his pony and engaged the fellow on the right, with whom he had a pretty tough fight. In the struggle his feet got entangled in his long loose trousers, and he fell on his back. His enemy tried to cut off his head, but Nakai parried the blow, receiving only a scalp wound, and pierced the man’s breast with the point of his sword at the same time. This sickened him, and as he was turning his back on Nakai he received a blow on the shoulder from Goto’s sword, which prostrated him on the ground, and Nakai jumping up hacked off his head”.³⁶

In the aftermath of this incident, the British Minister, Harry Parkes, made four demands on the Meiji government. First, he demanded that the Japanese government present a formal letter apologising for the incident. Secondly, he demanded that the men who made the attack should not be allowed to die by their own hand and commit *seppuku*, or self-disembowelment. He now understood that such an honourable suicide would turn the criminals into heroic martyrs. Parkes knew that by making this demand he was setting the Nawate Incident apart from the Kobe and Sakai incidents in which the men who took responsibility would be seen as having maintained their honour. By taking away the privilege of committing suicide, the men responsible for the Nawate Incident simply became common criminals and would be

remembered as such by the public.

Parkes wanted to make sure that such attacks on foreigners would absolutely never be repeated ever again. He believed that the best way to prevent more attacks would be to make such actions a criminal offence with the worst kind of shame³⁷ attached to it. In his letter to Lord Stanley of March 25th, 1868, Parkes explains,

... I recurred to arguments which I had previously held with some members of the Government as to the necessity of an enactment being speedily issued which should attach the penalty of an ignominious death to all Samurai who committed murderous attacks upon foreigners, instead of allowing them to die with credit by their own hand.³⁸

Parkes was thoroughly insistent on the topic and further on in the same letter he explains further to Lord Stanley that,

... the general measure I had advocated will be adopted in this case: the man will first be deprived of his rank, and he will then die by the common executioner instead of by his own hand. The Ministers proceeded to assure me that this would become the law of such cases in future, and that a proclamation of the character I had advocated should speedily be issued, and a draft furnished to me before I left Kyoto. They willingly agreed that this proclamation should be promulgated in the formal and permanent manner adopted by themselves in regard to standing enactments, namely, by inscription on boards which are affixed upon a sort of monumental arch constructed at conspicuous places in their towns and villages.³⁹

In his third demand, Parkes insisted that the Emperor must announce to the Japanese people the intentions of his government for promoting good relations with foreign nations. Finally, in his fourth demand Parkes called for the Meiji government's compulsory duty to thoroughly eradicate any notion among the Japanese people of becoming involved in attacks on, or becoming hostile to, foreign representatives and residents in Japan.

Whilst making such strong demands on the Japanese government, Parkes

was also very careful to mention the positive actions on the Japanese government's side in relation to their actions at the time of the incident. He commends the two Japanese government representatives especially for saving his life. In a letter from Kyoto on March 25th, just two days after the incident, sent to the Japanese government heads including Prince Sanjō Sanetomi (1837–1891) and Iwakura Tomomi (1825–1883), Parkes says,

The undersigned cannot close this despatch without bearing testimony to the noble behaviour of Goto Shojiro and Nakai Kozō, the two Japanese officers who were conducting him to the palace when he was attacked. Regardless of their own safety, and thinking only of the duty with which they were charged, they threw themselves upon the assassins, and killed one of them upon the spot. The undersigned deeply regrets that Nakai Kozō should have received a severe wound in the struggle.⁴⁰

As Satow has noted, Nakai had received a scalp wound. He took time after the Nawate Incident for convalescence during which he managed to work on the publication of his travel diary of his recent journey to Britain. Nakai had started out with the same ideas of *jōi* like Sakamoto Ryōma and like the two perpetrators of the Nawate attack, Saegusa Shigeru and Hayashida Sadakata, and now here he was preventing these men from carrying out their purpose in order to save the barbarian he had also once so vehemently hated. His situation was the same for many other Meiji leaders who had started out with ideas of *jōi*. The difference between the Nawate Incident and the Kobe and Sakai incidents is of course clear in a practical sense: nobody on the foreign community side was actually killed or severely wounded at Nawate. This may be one key reason why the incident has not been as well remembered by the history books, unlike the Kobe and Sakai incidents. However, in a conceptual sense, despite the fact that nobody was killed among the foreign residents, this incident at Nawate is perhaps the most important of all the three cases.

It was the Nawate Incident that caused the members of the foreign community, in particular the British, to make such strong demands on the Meiji government to put a stop to attacks on foreigners once and for all.

Harry Parkes' adamant demands on the government forced them to take action. Just as he demanded, on April 7th, 1868, the Meiji government posted official proclamations on notice boards around Japan upon which the stance of the Meiji government was made clear⁴¹. All together there were five proclamations made to the Japanese public by the new government. They were: 1) adherence to the five relationship bonds of Confucianism, 2) prohibition of making direct petitions, conspiracy and abandoning one's land for tax evasion purposes, 3) prohibition of Christianity, 4) prohibition on attacking foreigners, and 5) prohibition on travelling outside of one's domain or out of the country. Most of these proclamations were not terribly different from previous government announcements, but for the first time, the fourth proclamation made it very clear to the Japanese people what the consequences would be if anybody attempted to attack a member of the foreign community.

By 1868, Japan was changing. It was becoming a new 'Westernised' nation. With the Meiji era, and an Emperor who was more favourable to connecting with the West than his predecessor, Emperor Komei had been, Japan was gradually opening up to the West. Many of those who had previously had ideas of *jōi*, like Nakai's example, recognised the need for Western learning. Some of them even travelled abroad to study. The notion of maintaining the old status quo in Japan and remaining secluded was gradually realised as unfeasible. Instead, Japan went 'full steam ahead' into industrialisation and modernisation.

4. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to examine the reasons for, development, and eventual waning of, the theory of *Jōi*, or "Expelling the Barbarian", by bringing to attention the activities of a number of key actors and events in Japanese history. Attention has been placed on three key events in early 1868 that, at least officially, brought an end to the concept of *jōi*, in particular the final event known as the Nawate Incident of March 23rd, 1868. The paper has suggested that it was this key event that turned things around for the

relationship between the foreign nations involved in Japan, and the change in Japan's policy towards other nations. That is not to say that all incidences of foreign representatives in Japan being attacked ended completely with the Nawate Incident. Unfortunately, somewhat later on, there was one very famous incident, the Ōtsu Incident, of May 11th 1891, for example. That was a failed attempt made on the life of the Russian Crown Prince, Nicholas, who later became the Russian Emperor Nicholas II. The incident occurred in Ōtsu, Shiga Prefecture when he was visiting on a day trip to Lake Biwa from Kyoto. The attacker was Tsuda Sanzō (1855–1891) who was one of the prince's escorting police officers who believed Nicholas was in Japan as a spy in order to plan for a Russian invasion of Japan. Tsuda struck Nicholas in the face with a sabre, but the blow was parried by Nicholas' cousin, Prince George of Greece, who was accompanying Nicholas on his trip. Tsuda was sent to prison for his actions, and later that year, died in prison of illness.

There were also incidences of attacks being made on Japanese Meiji government leaders for their policies and decision-making. One good example of that is the attack made on Ōkubo Toshimichi in 1878, the Satsuma samurai who had been a key leader in the Meiji government; he was a member of the Iwakura Mission that had travelled around the world learning from the West, and he helped Japan to modernise. There were then, still some attacks that occurred, but they were no longer based strictly on the concept of *jōi* per se. Japan was modernising and becoming a member state on the world stage.

Japan went on to fight the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) as well as the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) and won both wars. The other Great Powers, including Britain, gradually came to see Japan as a force to be reckoned with. Indeed, Britain formed an alliance with Japan in 1902, which continued for some twenty years. As Japan modernised and entered the world stage, the *Jōi* Movement gradually became a thing of the past. Instead, Japan was able to gain the respect of the international community and there was less fear of Japan being invaded. Rather, Japan began to build up its own empire and, as later history demonstrates, became the invader. Some might argue that *jōi* actually did not disappear, but instead came closer to its real meaning.

Michael Gardiner, in his work on the life of Thomas Glover explains,

Joi is often transliterated as ‘Expel the foreigner!’, complete with exclamation mark, but jo derives from cleaning or wiping, and i is difference, suggesting ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a translation. Nevertheless joi had a double aim of maintaining ethnic purity and aspiring to foreign logistics, meaning that the joi rebels were more willing to be ‘open’ than the recognised government.⁴²

In actuality, many of those who had been influenced by the texts of the Mito school, such as Aizawa Seishisai’s *Shinron*, whether they had directly read them or not, had later gone on to become leaders of the Meiji government. Two famous Chōshū men of the Meiji period, Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909) who went on to become Japan’s first Prime Minister, and Inoue Kaoru (1836–1915) who was the Meiji government’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and attempted to right the wrongs of the Unequal Treaties signed by Ii Naosuke’s government; Inoue also had the Rokumeikan built for the purpose of entertaining foreign guests, were both involved in an arson attack on the British Legation when it was stationed at Tōzenji in Edo, in 1861. Just four years after they attacked the Legation, both men travelled secretly to Britain in 1865. They had both, by that point, come to realise the futility of trying to keep the foreigners out of Japan. Japan needed to study the technology and sciences, among other subjects, that were advancing in the West.

These ‘men of purpose’ now held the weighty reins of responsibility and power with the Emperor as their Divine leader. They now understood that if they could not beat the great foreign powers they would have to join them, and make Japan a great power, too. The three key incidents at Kobe, Sakai and Nawate gave these new leaders the experience they needed for successful diplomatic relations with other nations. They managed to earn the respect of Western powers. Indeed, Western powers were even surprised at how quickly and skilfully the Japanese were able to develop into a modern nation. Many visitors to Japan even found themselves lamenting Japan’s modernisation and wishing Japan had remained the exotic, romantic place they had read about. At least now they were able to move about freely without the fear of attack

and death looming over them. As for the Japanese people, modernisation brought with it new challenges; connection with the world brought new dilemmas, particularly in the form of identity and nationalism.

The subject of *jōi* is a key element of Japan's modern history. Although the terminology may be Japanese and its usage is only usually seen in a Japanese historical context, the concept of “expelling barbarians” is one that has appeared time and time again in various countries across the globe. The human-constructed concept of national borders, and who belongs within them, or outside them, is one that has plagued the minds of humans since the early days of their development. It is a concept that humanity is perhaps unlikely to abandon in any near future, and therefore, it is one that needs a more concrete understanding in order to deal with it in the best way possible, preferably without humans inflicting pain or damage on each other. From this perspective, an historical study, such as this paper has attempted to introduce, of the thought processes that go into, and the actions that come out of, the idea of “expelling barbarians”, or “expelling the foreign”, is vital to developing better human relationships.

Acknowledgments

This paper has its beginnings in 1998, when I began research on a project for undergraduate studies at Sheffield University in the UK, and I would like to thank the professors there for the inspiration they provided to follow up research in this field. In particular, my thanks go to Professor Graham Healey, Professor Emeritus James H. Grayson, the two supervisors for my initial project, and Dr. Richard Siddle who kindly supervised my graduation thesis about Sakamoto Ryōma. The subject of *Jōi* is something that I began to take an interest in at undergraduate level and continues to intrigue me. It is certainly an area that requires further understanding in the modern world, too.

As part of an undergraduate studies programme in Japanese, I was sent to Doshisha University in Kyoto where I was fortunate enough to be placed in the very city where many of the activities of the *shishi* actually occurred. Many of the graves of such men can be found in the cemetery at Gokoku Shrine. The cemetery lands originally belonged to the neighbouring Reimei Shrine, but were procured by the Meiji government and assigned to the newly constructed Gokoku Shrine. I am also very

grateful to Mr. Murakami Shigeki, the head priest of Reimei Shrine for kindly sharing his insights on the lives of several *shishi*, including Saegusa Shigeru and Hayashida Sadakata, the two men killed for carrying out the attack at Nawate-dōri on Harry Parkes and the other British representatives in 1868.

Finally, my sincere appreciation goes to Mr. Akao Hiroaki and his wife Ryōko of the Kyoto Ryōma Society, Mr. Miyakawa Teichi of the Kyoto National Museum, the historical novelist Mr. Kirino Sakujin, historian scholar, Mr. Nakamura Takeo, the private historian, Ms. Minagawa Mariko and the descendent of Nakai Hiromu, Mr. Yashiki Shigeo. It is important to mention the help of the Kyoto Ryōma Society and the acquaintances I have made through that organisation because as an organisation, which gets strongly involved with the community, their work is invaluable in perpetuating the memory of these historical figures. Mr. Akao, in particular, features in Henry D. Smith II's chapter, *Sakamoto Ryōma in Kyoto: Getting in Personal Touch with the Past in Heisei Japan*, in the work, *Japan and its Worlds Marius B. Jansen and the Internationalization of Japanese Studies*, (2007) edited by Martin Collcut, *et al.* At the time of that book's publication, the Kyoto Ryōma Society was in its thirteenth year; in 2014 it celebrates 20 years since its establishment in 1994. In all those years, Mr. Akao and the other members of the society have worked, and continue to work hard to put together various events throughout the year commemorating the life of Sakamoto Ryōma and other *shishi*. The latest example of this is the Bakumatsu Festival that in 2014 has seen its second year and looks to be continued for many years to come. The affect that Sakamoto Ryōma and other "men of purpose" like him have had on Kyoto and other places around Japan is phenomenal. The research of Dr. Philip Seaton of Hokkaido University⁴³ is a good resource in the area of tourism and Bakumatsu history. These 'men of purpose', although they died more than one hundred and fifty years ago, still live on in spirit throughout Japan, and indeed the world.

Finally, Machida Akihiro and his work, *Jōi no Bakumatsu-shi* (2010), have also been a great inspiration in developing this paper, and I am currently working on an English translation of that publication.

I am immensely grateful to the works and teachings of all those who have trodden this path before and who have taught me so much. Thank you.

Notes

- 1 The word *shishi* has the notion of a 'zealous patriot', or 'Imperial patriot' and refers to the men who were loyal to the Emperor and worked toward the restoration of his

- power as the head of the Japanese nation.
- 2 Craig, 2000, p. xiv.
 - 3 For example, in his *New Theses of 1825*, Aizawa Seishisai describes Japan as a ‘Divine Realm’.
 - 4 English translation in Jansen, 1994, p. 83.
 - 5 Nakai’s involvement in the Seichū-gumi is noted in Yashiki Shigeo’s *Nakai Ōshū—Meiji no Genkun ni Mottomo Tayorareta Meisanbō* (2010), p. 50. Yashiki Shigeo is a descendent of Nakai Hiromu.
 - 6 *Ibid.*
 - 7 Marius B. Jansen, ed., (1989) *The Cambridge History of Japan Volume 5 The Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge University Press.
 - 8 Harold Bolitho, *The Tempō Crisis* in Marius B. Jansen (ed.) *The Emergence of Meiji Japan*, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
 - 9 Wakabayashi, 1986.
 - 10 Wakabayashi, 1986, p. xiii.
 - 11 Koschmann, 1987, p. 173.
 - 12 Wakabayashi, 1986, p. xi.
 - 13 *Ibid.*
 - 14 Wakabayashi, 1986, p. ix.
 - 15 *Ibid.*
 - 16 Aizawa Seishisai, *Shinron*. This English translation in Wakabayashi, 1986, p. 149.
 - 17 Aizawa Seishisai, *Shinron*, in Wakabayashi, 1986, p. 224.
 - 18 Wakabayashi, 1986, p. 109.
 - 19 *Ibid.*
 - 20 Robinson, Eleanor (2013), trans., *Nakai Hiromu’s A Travel Sketch of the West—A New Account of Crossing the Seas, Book One: An Annotated Translation*, in *The Journal of the Faculty of Foreign Studies Aichi Prefectural University, No. 45, Area Studies and International Relations*, Faculty of Foreign Studies, Aichi Prefectural University, pp. 274.
 - 21 Koschmann, 1987, p. 3.
 - 22 Yamada, 2004, pp. 141–144.
 - 23 Officially the Japanese era naming changed from Keio to Meiji on October 23rd 1868 when the ceremony was held in which the Emperor Meiji officially took the throne; that was the eighth day of the ninth month in the Japanese lunar calendar. These three incidences happened earlier in the year so they are alternately described as happening in either the fourth year of Keio or the first year of Meiji.
 - 24 Satow, 2000, p. 316.

- 25 *Ibid.*
- 26 Mitford, 2005, p. 275.
- 27 Satow, 2000, p. 317.
- 28 *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho—Meiji No. 1, Volume 1* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993 edition), pp. 214–215. Available online at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryō/archives/1-1.html> (Retrieved: 2014/10/11).
- 29 Yano Tsuneo, (2008) *Ishin Gaikō Hitsuroku Kōbe Jiken*, Forum A, pp. 144–148.
- 30 *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho—Meiji No. 1, Volume 1* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993 edition), pp. 387–388. Available online at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryō/archives/1-1.html> (Retrieved: 2014/10/11).
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 404.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 405.
- 33 Satow, 2000, pp. 348–349.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p. 348.
- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 349.
- 36 *Ibid.*, p. 356.
- 37 Robinson, Eleanor, *Nakai Hiromu: Meiji Statesman and Hero of Anglo-Japanese Relations*, unpublished doctoral thesis, Kyoto University 2012.
- 38 *British Documents on Foreign Affairs—Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, Ian Nish (ed.), (University Publications of America, 1989). These letters are also reproduced in the doctoral thesis by this author noted above: Robinson, Eleanor, *Nakai Hiromu: Meiji Statesman and Hero of Anglo-Japanese Relations*, unpublished doctoral thesis, Kyoto University 2012.
- 39 *British Documents on Foreign Affairs—Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, Ian Nish (ed.), (University Publications of America, 1989).
- 40 *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho—Meiji No. 1, Volume 1* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993 edition), pp. 492–493. Available online at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryō/archives/1-1.html> (Retrieved: 2014/10/11).
- 41 An example of one of these notice boards carrying the fourth proclamation can be seen, for example, in the Nagoya City Museum.
- 42 Gardiner, 2007, p. 27.
- 43 Dr. Seaton’s list of publications can be found at <http://www.philipseaton.net/publications/>.

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