Defining and Breaching the Nation-State: Transnational Movements of Japanese and Canadians across the U.S.-Canadian Border

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加米国境の構築と越境者たち
——日本人とカナダ人移民の越境を中心に——

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要 旨

カナダとアメリカ合衆国の間を走る5000キロをこえる国境は、「世界で最も長い無防備な国境」という呼称が示すように、ごく最近まで人々が比較的自由に往来することができる国境として知られてきた。歴史的に安全かつオープンな国境地帯というイメージの背景には、ケベック州を除く加米両国に住む人々が地理的、文化的、言語的、宗教的に高い同質性を備えている点が指摘されている（Randy William Widdis, 1998; Bruno Ramirez, 2001; Erika Lee, 2003）。しかしその一方で、まさにこうした加米国境の特徴が、19世紀末まで両国の政策立案者や入国管理官の観点となり、また後世の研究者にとっても見落とされがちな、いわば見えない国境としての存在につながってきたいといえよう。さらに、こうした加米国境の不可視性は、今日不法移民の代名詞として語されることの多いメキシコ国境から合衆国への入国とは対照的に、加米国境を越えた数百万万人ともいえる移民たちをも見えない存在としてきたのである。

本稿では20世紀初頭のこの見えない（あるいは見えにくい）加米国境を越えた二つの集団、カナダ人と日本人移民・越境者に焦点をあてる。二集団の越境が示唆するのは、どのようなダイナミズムなのだろうか。米国連邦移民局が作成した記名式史料（Subject CorrespondenceとSoundex Index to the Border Entries）と移民に関する米国連邦産業委員会の報告書の分析からは移民、国境、そして国民国家の重層的な関係を垣間みることができる。以下ではまず、カナダ人と日本人移民にとって加米国境が、いつ、どのように「見える国境」となったのかをたどる。次いで、加米国境に関する3つの機能
The migration paths across the Canadian-U.S. border in the early twentieth century demonstrate the permeability of the border and the transnational nature of lives as they were lived during this period. Tens, if not hundreds of thousands of people moved frequently back and forth across the boundary dividing Canada from the U.S.; others did so only once. In either case, personal and familial relationships and informal networks centring on migration agents, such as emigration companies, steamship lines and boardinghouses, transcended national borders. The importance of such transnational networks notwithstanding, the extent to which men and women crossed the border in compliance with, or in defiance of, border enforcement by the United States and Canada has remained largely invisible until recently.¹

The invisibility of cross-border movements across the Canadian-U.S. border is partly a result of the amicable relationship the United States and Canada have enjoyed since the mid-nineteenth century. Moreover, the dearth of significant geographic, cultural, linguistic, and religious barriers between Canadian and American people, with the exception of Québec, has helped to reinforce the notion that Canada and the United States share “the world’s longest undefended border”² with peace and satisfaction. Despite, or perhaps because of that, the issue of protecting the border to the north remained for a long time outside the realm of utmost concern as far as immigration policy and border enforcement of the U.S. federal government are concerned. Such lack of attention given to the northern border becomes even more glaring when considered against the plight of attention the southern border shared with Mexico commands in the past and present.

More importantly, perhaps, the dearth of scholarly attention given to the northern border and movement across the Canada-U.S. border stems from conceptual biases and methodological difficulties involved in the writing of history. In the United States, the existing scholarship on immigration history has tended to depict migrants and their descendants as national
actors, excluded or otherwise, whose lives were narrowly confined within national boundaries. This tendency has strengthened the "immigration paradigm" according to which all immigrants went to the U.S. to stay, and their settlement led to an inevitable and linear process of Americanization. British historian Frank Thistlethwaite criticized such interpretations as the "American-centred" view of immigration history as early as the 1960s, and Asian Americanist Gary Y. Okihiro echoed it three decades later, referring to U.S.-centred parochialism within Asian American studies. Such criticism notwithstanding, the "tyranny of the national" has kept a strong hold on the writing of history, including immigration history.

This essay departs from previous analyses that have privileged the nation-state perspective in immigration history. Instead, it addresses the cross-border movements of chosen migrants, Canadian and Japanese, from the vantage point of the borders being crossed. It focuses on the process of movement, as opposed to the process of settlement, following Japanese and Canadians (both French and English-speaking) who entered the United States across the Canadian border in the early twentieth century. Rather than asking the usual limited range of questions, such as what impact migrants had upon the nation-state or how they contributed to, or impeded, national unity, social stability and economic growth, this study raises questions that lead the opposite direction. What implication did border control have on the movements of Japanese and Canadians into and out of the U.S.? How did those migrants, in turn, react to such border control, perhaps even transforming the border itself in the process?

Canadians and Japanese were part of a continent-wide movement of men and women originating from Asia, Europe, and Canada seeking entry into the United States from Canada. Since the implementation of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, Japanese provided a source of labour replacement in the burgeoning economy of the American West. Shortly thereafter, like the Chinese labourers they replaced, Japanese became a target of racial discrimination, both legally and socially. Furthermore, as the latter pages will examine in greater detail, by the 1900s a series of restrictions that aimed to prevent the entry of Japanese in general, and labourers in particular, gave rise
to illegal practices among the Japanese, who sought to circumvent inspection by the U.S. immigration officials.

Canadians, on their part, were far less visible than their Japanese contemporaries when they migrated to the United States across the northern border. Despite their relative invisibility, Canadians, including both French and English-speaking Canadians, were among the first and leading groups of aliens to journey into (and many times back out of) the United States. The presence of Canadian settlers and migrants in New England, the Great Lakes region, and the Prairies reached such an extent that, as historian Bruno Ramirez has pointed out, the social, economic, and cultural history of states, provinces, and regions along the U.S. northern border cannot be fully appreciated “unless the processes that led millions [of Canadians] to move to the other side of the border” is examined.7 Granted, Canadians were distinct and diverse in the profiles, patterns, and purposes of their movements southward. Nonetheless, these features make Canadians a useful starting point to shed light on salient dimensions of the power relationships that helped define the Canada-U.S. border on the basis of the race and citizenship of the men and women who crossed that line.

**The Border as a Site of Transnational Politics**

The border that the United States and Canada shared generated little public debate in either country throughout most of the nineteenth century. That boundary line represented an arbitrary or “imaginary” line,8 separating people with similar historical and cultural origin, who created and adhered to politically different institutions. But by the 1890s, the nature of the common border changed radically.9 As the U.S. federal government stepped up its effort to tighten inspection at the northern border, the first step was to establish the U.S. Federal Bureau of Immigration. In 1907, this new bureau opened a string of checkpoints along the northern border, manning them with immigration inspectors in place of the customs officers who had up until then checked entrants along with the luggage they carried.10 Now all foreigners, regardless of their nationality, had to submit to formal inspection.
when seeking admission into the United States At roughly the same time, tighter control of immigration led to the reaffirmation of labour contract laws in 1903 and a series of Immigration Acts (in 1906, 1907, 1913, 1917 and 1924), two changes that specifically targeted racial minorities, especially Asians, while exempting Canadians from any of the new regulations being implemented.

Protecting the northern border required securing the cooperation of the neighbour to the north—a mission that proved to be unexpectedly complicated, at least initially, for the United States One source of the difficulty and dissatisfaction felt by the United States resulted directly from the Canadian Government’s refusal to act as an official party to bilateral agreements forged with the United States The U.S.-Canadian Agreement of 1894, for example, was not signed by the Dominion Government, but instead was an agreement between the U.S. government and Canadian transportation companies. It stipulated that U.S. inspectors were to be assigned at Canadian seaports and inland points—which lay beyond the territorial limitations of the United States—and that they were to conduct examinations of all passengers. The statutory limitations left the agreement fundamentally defective, however, since its voluntary nature meant that the agreement lacked the power to be legally enforced if violated. Another, more serious flaw lay in the fact that the agreement applied only to immigrants manifested to locations in the United States, and not to those manifested to interior points within Canada. This meant that those ostensibly bound for Canada who intended to cross over to the American side later could do so at any time and thus evade U.S. inspection.

Making matters worse from the U.S. perspective, immigration commissioners at the American border had the power only to send those who were caught doing this back to where they had sought entry into the United States, i.e., the Canadian border, not back to the ship that initially transported them. As a result, many were able to re-enter the United States by subterfuge or false testimony immediately after their deportation. The easiest and most frequent method employed to evade inspection was simply to state that he or she was bound for Canada and not for the United States, since, once admitted
into Canada, one could enter the United States with relative ease.\textsuperscript{13}

The Canadian government had reasons of its own for its refusal to become an official partner to the U.S. proposal. For one thing, the U.S. proposal shared power unequally between the two proposed partners. For example, the Agreement of 1894 required that Canada would permit U.S. officials to extend their jurisdiction into Canadian territory. On this point, Erika Lee has argued that such arrangements in the Canadian Agreement meant that enforcement of a U.S. border policy with regard to Chinese immigration was intricately tied to the expansion of U.S. imperialism, extending thus the understanding of imperialism advanced by Matthew Fry Jacobson.\textsuperscript{14} Alternatively, one may argue that such practices differed little from current measures under which U.S. immigration officials examine U.S.-bound passengers in a Canadian airport, therefore exercising their power within the Canadian territories. One thing is certain: either as formality or as part of a larger system of American ideologies and systems of control, the effects of the Canadian Agreement implied that U.S. sovereignty can extend beyond its geographical boundaries. This created in turn a situation whereby the U.S. exercised its sovereignty over that of Canada. It is not surprising then that the hint of such a scenario infuriated not only the vocal handful of staunch Canadian nationalists but the wider Canadian public as well.

The U.S. Commissioner-General Herman Stump describes one such typical instance of nationalist concerns among Canadians overriding the spirit of cooperation with the United States. After his first trip to the northern border in 1894, Stump visited Ottawa, hoping to strike an accord with the Canadian government to encourage cooperation in border control. Stump recalled that the Canadian government was “inclined to grant” this agreement, but as soon as the [Canadian] newspapers got hold of their negotiation, it provoked “great excitement,” and consequently the Dominion government withdrew from the proposed agreement.\textsuperscript{15}

It would be a mistake to conclude, however, that the refusal of the Canadian government to act as an official party to the U.S. proposal reflected a lack of concern with what was increasingly debated as the “danger” of racial contamination. On the contrary, Canadians held an antipathy, by no
means less than that held by Americans, towards racial minorities in general and Asians in particular. Canadian officials made one important distinction, however. Unlike agricultural migrants from central and Eastern Europe, who bypassed Canada on their way to the United States and who, by doing so, inflamed national debates over the costly federal campaign to attract them to the Canadian West,16 Asian labourers who went through Canada on their way to the United States rated little concern. As long as they did not remain in the territory, the Canadian authorities believed, Japanese and Chinese landing on their shores did not threaten to change Canada’s social order. Such views on the Canadian side led to what U.S. officials deplored as the remarkably indifferent attitude displayed by Canadian immigration officials, who were said to “get the money [from the head tax system],” whereas “we [Americans] get the Chinamen.”17

By 1908, what U.S. officials regarded as the leniency of Canadian border enforcement came to constitute only half of the whole picture. Canada set up its border control according to its own principles, which were not necessarily compatible with American goals. Contrary to this purported laxity, the Dominion government acted firmly against Japanese and other Asian migrants who sought admission into Canada from the United States. The journey of one Japanese labourer, Tatsumi N[M?]itsutaro, serves to illustrate this fact. On March 17, 1908, Tatsumi entered the United States from Mexico at Eagle Pass, Texas, and subsequently went to Blaine, Washington (located near the northern border), as he made his way back to Japan. During his entry into Canada, he told a Canadian immigration officer of his intentions: he was going to Vancouver, British Columbia, where he intended to catch a steamship back to Japan. His entry was refused, however. Why? It was Canadian policy that foreigners seeking entry into Canada from the United States be returned to the country from which they entered the United States in cases in which he or she had entered the United States from somewhere other than the land of their birth or citizenship. Because Tatsumi had not entered the United States directly from Japan, but rather via Mexico, he was declared inadmissible to Canada and was therefore to be returned to Mexico.18

Appalled by this application of the Canadian regulation, a U.S. Immigration
officer in San Antonio, Texas, wrote a letter to the Commissioner-General of Immigration in Washington D.C. In it, the San Antonio officer describes the situation as "embarrassing" and calls for an intervention by Washington, but to no avail. The willingness of the San Antonio official to help out, or perhaps more precisely, get rid of the stranded foreigner may be exceptional. But the indifference with which the Bureau of Immigration in Washington reacted to the plea of its agent is strikingly similar to the attitude of the Canadian government towards the U.S.-bound Chinese migrants discussed earlier. Such parallels stem, on one hand, from the similar indifference displayed by the two countries towards undesirable and potentially dangerous foreigners who passed through their respective countries, while on the other hand, it could also stem from the two countries' mutual preoccupation with those who entered each country. What set the attitudes of the two countries apart was, therefore, not the principle of desirability measured on a racial and national hierarchy of difference, but rather on the direction of migration flow.

It comes as little surprise, then, that the existing racial order on both sides of the border eventually provided a basis for the United States to induce its northern neighbour to adopt restrictive immigration laws more compatible with the goals and terms of U.S. policies. At the same time, diplomatic concerns led U.S. policymakers striving to secure cooperation from Canada to make the point that the application of increasingly stringent U.S. immigration restrictions—and later, the implementation of visa requirements and a national quota system—exempted Canadians, although not without Congressional debate.19 And so, in 1902, the House of Commons in Ottawa passed an Act of Parliament designed to prevent "the landing at Canadian ports of any immigrants or passengers with health problems," such as dangerous infectious diseases. Unlike previous agreements, the 1902 Act did not make any distinction regarding whether such immigrants "intend[ed] to settle in Canada or only to pass through Canada to settle in some other country."20 Following the passage of a 1903 U.S. anti-contract labour law, which crystallized the de facto exclusion of Japanese labourers, and the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1907 between Japan and the United States, Canada signed the Hayashi-Lemieux Agreement of 1908,
which was a Canadian version of the Gentlemen’s Agreement and closely mirrored this U.S.-Japan agreement. That same year, Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed Executive Order 589, which barred foreign contract labourers (especially Japanese) from entering the United States from Canada, Mexico, or any insular possessions of the United States (such as Hawai’i). Canada echoed this Executive Order by adopting a similar regulation, providing a basis for Canada’s refusal to admit the entry of foreigners like Tatsumi. Finally, the U.S. Acts of Immigration in 1924 completed the general shift towards barring the entry of Asian migrants and restricting immigration from southern and eastern Europe, restrictions from which all Canadians were exempted. A parallel shift in Canadian policy had taken place in 1923, when the Order in Council excluded “any immigrant of any Asiatic race,” except agriculturalists, farm labourers, female domestic servants, and wife and children of a person legally in Canada. In 1930, the Dominion government closed its ports to all Asians when it issued Order in Council (P.C. 2115), just as the U.S. law instigated seven years earlier did.21

**The Border as a Site of State Control**

Another form of border politics that emerged from the enforcement of the border was one affecting the relationship between the nation-state and individual migrants. Neil Gotanda has observed that nativist movements were never indiscriminately directed against all foreigners.22 Likewise, the northern border did not prevent all foreigners from entering the United States on an equal basis; rather, the border sieved selectively, and did so with respect to migrants from Japan and Canada. The gigantic legal and administrative filter built by the U.S. federal government, in cooperation and conflict with its Canadian counterparts, reflected and reinforced hierarchies of difference on the basis of race and citizenship. Such hierarchies in turn shaped the human movements and politics surrounding such movements, which possessed very different dynamics depending on whether it was Japanese or Canadians attempting to cross the border.

The distinctive forms of politics that took place at the border—as opposed
to at the ballot box, as discussed by historian Tessa Morris-Suzuki—has not fully received the scholarly attention it deserves in the writing of migration history and border control until recently. This has largely been the result of the unquestioned status of national sovereignty, a myth that has tended to rule out the possibility of two-way interaction at the point at which state power comes into contact with the lives of people on the move. The power relationship between migrating individuals and the United States was unequal and discriminatory in that the U.S. government unilaterally decided the terms of admission in order to sift those deemed desirable from the undesirable and allow only the former into the country. Migrants, on the other hand, remained without any legally sanctioned rights to support, or contest, the construction of such selection criteria as they were imposed by the state to regulate their movements.

Privileged Mobility: The Cross-Border Movement of Canadians

No other group entered the United States with greater ease than Canadians, whose itineraries crisscrossed the northern border yearly, seasonally, and, in some cases, daily. Geographic proximity to U.S. destinations, membership in a country of the Northern Hemisphere, good standing within the existing racial order and, above all, the lack of statutory regulations reducing their transnational mobility all combined to help sustain Canadians’ freedom of circulation at least to some degree. Although Canadians had their some of their freedom of circulation reduced, as Bruno Ramirez has argued, Canadians enjoyed a level of mobility that remained little fundamentally changed from that enjoyed before the implementation of the 1908 border control measures.

In 1901, the Industrial Commission of Immigration reported massive arrivals of Canadians into Boston. Hailing for the most part from English-speaking parts of the Maritime Provinces, they entered Boston yearly via steamship from Yarmouth and Halifax. Their number was estimated at between 50,000 to 70,000 in 1901. This migration was characterized by its cyclical nature, according to which migrants left for that “Boston state,” as
they familiarly called it, both yearly and seasonally. Many travelled "in the fall to look for work on farms and getting in the crops, and in the spring as fishermen and lumbermen."\textsuperscript{26}

Daily commuting across the border was another common migration pattern for English-speaking Canadians. The ferries at Detroit and Buffalo required only five to fifteen minutes to reach the Canadian shore. As a result, hundreds of factory workers, unskilled labourers, and white-collar workers living on the Canadian side of the border "crossed daily for their regular employment."\textsuperscript{27} At Detroit, the number of daily arrivals of Canadians from Windsor, Ontario was estimated to number from five to six hundred. A good proportion were carpenters and masons, who went to the American side with their dinner pails in the morning and returned home to Canada at night. This practice gave rise to the nickname "bucket brigades."\textsuperscript{28} Other groups included unskilled labourers; clerical workers including stenographers, typewriters and clerks; and large numbers of nurses, who made better wages for their clerical, professional, and linguistic skills on the other side of the border.\textsuperscript{29}

A combination of factors magnified the "proximity of opportunities"\textsuperscript{30} for these English-speaking Canadian migrants whose movement spanned the continent. All provinces of the Dominion contributed—or lost, depending on how one calculated the benefit—portions of their citizenry to the American states located close to the border.\textsuperscript{31} In addition to the low cost of transportation ($1.50 for a steamship ride from Yarmouth and Halifax to Boston), the lower costs of living on the Canadian side and higher wages on the American were among the most important considerations for Canadians on the move.\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, many immigrants were naturalized American citizens who, after living in the United States for five years (the time period required for obtaining citizenship), ended up moving back to the Canadian side to enjoy the lower cost of living. There were exceptions to this, however. In cities like Toronto, wages were about the same as they were in Detroit, and in Windsor, the largest Canadian "border city," the cost of living was about the same level as the American city. Though rents were cheaper in Windsor, they were no cheaper than those found in the suburbs of Detroit on the American side. This led the 1901 report to conclude that Windsor was "in practice, a suburb" of
Detroit. Like their English counterparts, tens of thousands of French Canadians crossed the border every year. Unlike English Canadians, transnational commuting was not common among French Canadians, partly because the proximity of opportunities for them was located farther south of their homeland. Nevertheless, a good proportion travelled across the border more than once, and when they returned to the United States, they tended to head for a city or region where they had once previously resided, however briefly. For example, two out of three (66 percent) French Canadians bound for the textile city of Lowell, Massachusetts, between 1900 and 1920 had been to the United States prior to their recorded travel to that city. Among them, an overwhelming proportion (81 percent) had resided in Lowell proper. Moreover, out of those who had not lived in Lowell, a good proportion had spent time in neighbouring cities in Massachusetts, often Boston (forty kilometres southwest of Lowell), or in other New England textile centres. Only a very small minority had previously resided in other parts of the United States besides New England.

The Brière family exemplifies the majority of French Canadians who moved several times between their hometowns and one or more destinations in the United States. On September 24, 1909, the Brières crossed the border as they journeyed to Lowell. The birthplace of their children suggests that the couple, Annie (born in St.-Tite) and Delphis (born in Louisville), lived most of their early married life in the rural parish of St.-Tite in the Mauricie, save for six years between 1899 and 1905, when they lived in Lowell. In addition, Delphis indicated that he had been to that city in 1889, when he was thirteen years old. Twenty years later, the Brières left St.-Tite again and moved to that New England textile city on a permanent basis. The couple then travelled with their young children: Béatrice, who was ten years old, William, seven, and Arthur, four. A year later, the U.S. Federal census of 1910 listed the family in Lowell. Annie worked as a weaver and Delphis as a box maker, with four children: Béatrice, William, Arthur, and a new, Massachusetts-born son, Joseph.

The relative ease with which Canadians moved across the border
notwithstanding, their arrival in the United States did not go unnoticed. On the contrary, both French and English-speaking Canadians irritated immigration officials, politicians, and labour leaders in the United States. Referring to the arrival of Canadians en masse into industrial centres along the border, the report of the Industrial Commission in 1901 voiced criticism aimed at Canadian workers. It stated that: “Canadians do not cut wages. But by flooding the market they keep them from rising to the standard of other places, such as Toledo and Chicago.” An American immigration official claimed that both the United States and Canada suffered when Canadians left their country for America. At a hearing before the Industrial Commission on Immigration in 1901, Herman Stump, then ex-Commissioner General of Immigration, asked rhetorically: “Why does Canada feel sorry to see labourers come here and the United States feel sorry to see them come?” It was because of the loss incurred on both sides of the border, he explained: “Canada lost by not having the benefit of their labour to develop her industries,” while “the United States also lost,” because Canadians allegedly “worked for less wages than the American citizens with whom they come in competition, thus lowering the rates of wages” of American workers. Even worse, Stump added, these Canadians did not spend their money where they earned it, but took the money back to where they came from. Similar criticisms of Canadian workers resurfaced some two decades later, this time among American labour unionists.

Despite such accusations, as this and other evidence shows, the criticism launched against Canadians in early twentieth century America was couched in economic terms and stemmed largely from labour protectionism. This contrasted with xenophobic reactions against migrants from Asia and parts of Europe, which was unleashed predominately, though not exclusively, on racial grounds. Such differences in rhetoric in turn translated into the strict and selective enforcement of border regulations, which left the northern border practically open to most Canadians even as it aimed to screen out the influx of Japanese at the border.
Doubled Chances: 
The Cross-Border Movements of Japanese Migrants

It was in an increasingly racially antagonistic America that Japanese migrants, in contrast to their Canadian counterparts, had to face the harsh reality of strict border control. Tens of thousands of Japanese travelled through two Canadian seaports, Vancouver and Victoria, and from there eventually relocated to the United States. Although no statistics are available that show the exact numbers of the Japanese who arrived at their U.S. destination via Canada, the numbers certainly reached the thousands, and likely the tens of thousands. The Commissioner-General of Immigration F. P. Sargent reported 11,051 Japanese arrivals into the United States by way of Canada during the period from 1900 to 1905. An American official estimated that at one point as much as 90 percent of the Japanese who came to Canada entered the United States within two weeks of their arrival. A more moderate estimate places the figure around 45% in 1907. In the fall of the same year, an American inspector overseeing the border crossing at Vancouver reported the alleged entry of some three hundred Japanese during the last two days of July or the first few days of August at or near Blaine, Washington, which was located on the U.S.-Canadian border on the opposite side of Douglas, B.C. Furthermore, President Roosevelt’s Executive Order of 1908 caused this human flow to swell, albeit momentarily, as prospective labourers from Japan rushed to the northern border before passage from Canada to the United States would be banned permanently. In that year, of the 8,046 Japanese who landed in Canada, 3,619 men and women reportedly went to the United States immediately afterward, resulting in a spike in Japanese migration across the northern border. About 35 percent of the 8,046 Japanese who arrived in Canada had bypassed Hawai‘i and Mexico (9 individuals for the latter) before going to Canada, while 20 percent (1,641 immigrants) arrived directly from Japan.

Unlike Canadians, whose occupational backgrounds ranged from farming, factory work, and carpentry to wives and children with or without former experience of paid work at all, the Japanese who entered the United States by
way of Canada were mostly contract labourers heading for U.S. destinations such as Seattle, San Francisco and Portland. In 1900, the U.S. Commissioner-General of Immigration, Terence V. Powderly, stated that “the large influx of Japanese through Vancouver and Victoria, British Columbia, gained special force as regards our [the U.S.] northwestern territory.” He continued, “these Japanese,” along with Chinese, “continuously violated the alien-contract labour laws, particularly in the Puget-Sound district.” Investigation by the State Labour Bureau of California reasserted this point: “Nearly all of the coolies who were examined testified that they had not come to San Francisco direct, but had come from the north, most of them having landed at Vancouver, British Columbia.”

One of the most important paths through which Japanese entered the United States from Canada connected Victoria and Vancouver to Seattle through the Puget Sound area. The Sound, as it was familiarly called, extends from southern British Columbia to northern Washington State and includes a strait, a large gulf in Washington State, the water that separates Vancouver Island from the West Coast, and the water that opens into the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Its multitude of islands and complex shoreline made the Sound the most advantageous spot for smuggling humans into the United States, as U.S. Immigration inspector Marcus Brown pointed out at the time.

Korio Chosaku was one of the many Japanese who made use of this passage through Puget Sound. The twenty-three-year-old single male labourer left his native prefecture of Ehime in southwestern Japan, landed in Victoria, June 12, 1907, and then two days later crossed the border bound for Seattle. Another example was Takamoto Josaburo. This twenty-six-year-old labourer was a native of Hiroshima and was married, but he was travelling without his family. Takamoto departed on his trans-Pacific journey in early November 1907. A week later he landed in Victoria. His destination in the United States? Seattle, Washington. When asked if he knew anyone there, he answered no.

Why did Takamoto, Korio, and many others like them get off the boat in Victoria and Vancouver, instead of travelling to their U.S. destination directly? There were several practical reasons for this. For one thing,
labourers who would be excluded under anti-contract labour laws had to resort to what an American immigration official called the “circuitous routes” along the border. They found a way to get around U.S. inspection at the ports of entry along the coast by passing instead through Canadian ports and then across the land border. They must have been informed—by migration agents, steamship crews, or by hearsay—of the relative ease with which they could follow the route to the United States through Canada: if they landed at Vancouver or Victoria, Canadian officials would inspect only those bound for Canada, while the U.S. immigration officials were authorized to inspect only the U.S.-bound passengers in transit at the Canadian ports. Many thus did exactly what the U.S. authorities feared they would, and simply reported their destination to be some point in Canada, and then once they reached their Canadian destination, they would cross to the American side with ease. Vancouver and Victoria thus provided these Japanese with a doubled chance of entry; “[i]f refused entry to that country [the United States],” a report of the Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration read, “they will return to this country [Canada], whereas if they sail direct from Japan and were refused entry they would be returned to Japan.47

The 1902 Act of Parliament closed some of these loopholes when it made mandatory the inspection at Canadian seaports of those heading for the United States. But the inspection at the Canadian ports remained far from satisfactory to U.S. immigration officials. Nishi Mori’ichi, fourteen years of age, told a U.S. immigration officer when he was apprehended that he landed in Canada without any inspection except for a medical examination on board the ship. What motivated Nishi to follow such a route? He explained that he learned on board about “lots of troubles and expense and inconvenience getting examined for admissions to the U.S.”48 This was why he went through Canada in order to reach his ultimate destination in the United States.

Other reasons for disembarking in Canada, according to claims made by other Japanese, were apparently more innocent. On May 30, 1907, Iguchi Saburo, a nineteen-year-old student, got off the SS Athenian when that ship sailed into Vancouver after a two-week voyage from Yokohama. His passport said that he was bound for Salinas, California. Asked why he did not go
directly to the United States, Iguchi answered that he had some friends in Vancouver and that he “wanted to stay there for awhile.”

Ishida Suejiro, a twenty-eight-year-old labourer from Shiga, also held a passport indicating that he was bound for the United States, even though he landed in Victoria. He explained: “I saw the climate was good here, [in Victoria] and that there was plenty of work, so I decided to stop in Canada.” But the U.S. immigration inspectors were not convinced. They believed that the true reasons behind the entry of these Japanese into Vancouver and Victoria was to use Canada as a backdoor into the United States.

Women also constituted a portion of this cross-border movement from Canada into the United States, although their numbers remained extremely small, reflecting perhaps the danger and difficulty of travel across the border, which only young, physically strong migrants could undertake. While the proportion of female migrants within the total number of Japanese admitted into the United States grew rapidly, ultimately reaching over 50 percent, only about one fifth (or twenty-six women) among border crossers I have studied were women. Among them, all except one were married, in their child-bearing/-rearing age, and travelled with their husbands or on tickets paid by them. The homogeneity of their demographic profiles—in sharp contrast to the diversity of their Canadian counterparts, whose number included single, married and widowed women of various ages—signals that many of these Japanese women were so-called “picture brides,” who journeyed to North America in order to marry men they had only seen in photographs.

These newlywed picture brides (shashin hanayome) of trans-Pacific arranged marriages were part of a phenomenon produced by the difficulty encountered by single Japanese male migrants attempting to find a marriage partner in turn-of-the-century United States and Canada. Tatsuhara Kieno was one of these likely picture brides. Some time after her arrival in Victoria, the twenty-four-year-old native of Hiroshima crossed the border into the United States accompanied by her twenty-seven-year-old husband, who paid her overseas passage. The couple headed for Portland, Oregon. Kanemitsu Umeno was another example. This thirty-two-year-old woman was from Okayama, in the southwestern part of Japan. Three months after her landing
on the North American shore (port of disembarkation unknown) in June 26, 1907, Umeno entered the United States with her husband, who was twenty-nine, and headed toward Los Angeles. Her husband paid her travel expenses. Yet another example is Hori Kume, a nineteen-year-old from Okayama. Kume landed in Victoria and headed for Portland, Oregon. Unlike Kieno and Umeno, Kume was travelling alone. But she, too, had a husband whom she listed as the person meeting her at her destination in the United States and paying her passage there.

The Border as a Site of Contestation

Japanese differed most clearly from Canadians when they sought entry into the United States clandestinely. This was, one may argue, a result of the heightened state controls put in place to enforce selective entry at the border—a filter that functioned in accordance with the state’s preferences in terms of the race and nationality of those seeking entry. This heightened enforcement of the border did not, however, bring an end to the arrival of undesirable foreigners, including Japanese. Rather, it impelled many among the rejected and potentially excluded to seek informal and unauthorized entry. The squeeze of the border control, therefore, created a bulge, rather than a halt, in the flow of Japanese entering the United States Canadians, in contrast, had little need to seek illegal entry because they could come and go across the border with relative ease, except for a few cases of rejection or instances in which they acted as so-called “guides,” i.e. smugglers.

It is impossible to ascertain how many Japanese crossed the border from Canada into the United States. Given the nature of their mode of entry since few were reluctant to speak publicly about their experiences. Investigations conducted by U.S. officials and the court hearings of Japanese in custody created a voluminous amount of case files in Subject Correspondence, but the real number of entrants must have run much higher than those recorded in these files. A member of the U.S. special commission termed this undocumented migration as a form of “smuggling” over the Canadian border; it was “next to impossible to police effectively,” given that the
“line of frontier is so extensive.”53 In 1901, William Jones, the President of the Labour Commission at Nanaimo, British Columbia, stated, “Nearly all Chinese and Japanese who come to this country are brought in under contract.” Although it was “extremely difficult to prove the existence of such contacts,” he continued, “two hundreds Japanese coolies were imported under contract to work in coal mines. […] There is of course some smuggling done over the border, and large numbers of Chinese and Japanese enter the United States in this way.”54

Another important distinction among Canadian and Japanese border-crossers was in the extent to which movement of the two groups was dependent upon, or independent of, family networks. Family and kin networks were indispensable for the migration of Canadians into the United States. Over ninety percent of the French Canadians bound for Lowell, Massachusetts, had a family member, such as father, uncle, sibling, or cousin, waiting to meet them upon their arrival.55 This is not to neglect the central role once played by migration recruiters—such as those sent by textile factories, railroad ticket agencies, and the Catholic Church—in the movement of Canadians across the border, but it should be noted that this was largely a labour system that operated in the mid-nineteenth century.56 By the new century, the role of migration middlemen became a legacy for most Canadian migrants, irrevocably replaced by webs of informal networks centring on filial connections.

Japanese, on the other hand, relied heavily on a range of networks, including underground ones, especially when they sought unauthorized entry into the United States. When asked at the border, the majority (about two thirds) of Japanese migrants stated that they had no one to meet them at their U.S. destination. This contradicts the extent to which Japanese immigrants were known to rely upon networks of family, kin and co-villagers. How can one explain such a disparity? One possible explanation is cultural. Japanese would considered it the greatest shame to cause any trouble or disgrace to their families or acquaintances. Such acts should be avoided at all costs. A cultural system that valued this belief might have dictated that those seeking entry not give the name of a contact at the destination even when
they had one due to the fear of burdening that person. Another, perhaps more important factor has to do with what one may call migration middlemen, including labour recruiters, emigration companies steamship companies, boardinghouse keepers and smugglers (or “guides”), all of whom formed a crucial part of the informal networks facilitating migrants’ passages across the Pacific and across the U.S.-Canadian border. U.S. Immigration officials were aware of the transnational operations of such underground networks. Suspecting keepers of Japanese boardinghouses in San Francisco, Seattle, as well as Pacific port cities in Canada, of smuggling, an immigration officer of the California Bureau wrote that they [boarding house keepers] constantly communicated with their friends and relatives in Japan, and that many Japanese, upon their arrival in Victoria or Vancouver, “went to one of these boarding houses, and within two or three days after arrival, they were sent out in gangs, under a boss, into the fields, orchards, and vineyards.” Many travelled in “bands,” or “gangs of coolie labourers,” numbering twenty-five or more.

The institutional dimension of Japanese cross-border networks should not gloss over the presence of family networks for undocumented entrants, however. The latter became increasingly important, especially in the period between 1907 and 1924, before the legal immigration of Japanese into the United States came to an end. In 1907, one can observe instances wherein family networks intertwined with underground webs of smugglers. Nishi Mori’ichi, for example, referred to a “guide” in Seattle, a former colleague of his father from an Idaho coalmine. This “guide,” named Kawaguchi, travelled to meet Mori’ichi in Vancouver because the latter had been refused admission into the United States due to a diagnosed trachoma. Kawaguchi then led Mori’ichi through the bushes in the vicinity of Blaine, Washington, in the Puget Sound area, and while walking the last stretch on the beach to reach the American side, both were arrested by U.S. immigration officers.

It was not likely that either the fourteen-year-old Nishi, his “guide,” or, for that matter, the many other Japanese who sought illegal entry into the United States fully understood the consequences of their act of border-crossing. But these very actions intensified alarm among the U.S. authorities because it
meant, above all, a breach in the capacity of border enforcement, a breach that represented a direct threat to the normalizing power of a nation-state, as Mae Ngai has pointed out, which was increasingly conscious of controlling human movement into—but rarely out of—its territory. In that sense, the cross-border movements of Japanese became the clearest form through which the power of the nation-state was contested, a contestation that took place in ways Canadian migration never had to risk.

Conclusion

A comparative analysis of the transnational movements of Japanese and Canadians across the land border between the U.S. and Canada has called into question the seemingly absolute power wielded by the nation-state to control such movement. Contrary to the symbolic power and geographic reality that the national border evoked (and continues to do so) as a marker of national sovereignty, the border did not keep out all foreigners equally; nor did it endow the state with the power to control individual movements across it unconstrained by external factors. The transnational nature of the Canada-U.S. border also meant that enforcement of the border required the United States to cooperate with Canada. Laws and regulations implemented at the border created a bureaucratic and administrative apparatus of border politics, which classified foreigners into hierarchies of difference according to race, ethnicity, and nationality (and, to a lesser extent, gender and class).

State efforts to control the border fell far short of making the borderland airtight, however. Rather, they incited resistance and even contestation among those Japanese deemed undesirable, and therefore excluded by the U.S. territorial boundary. The differences that emerged between the processes of movement conducted by Canadian and Japanese migrants—in demography, migration patterns and support networks, and although little discussed in this essay, reactions to restriction, especially in the form of smuggling—is a forceful reminder that border enforcement was a product of a two-way process that shaped, and was constantly reshaped by, the international politics between the United States and Canada and the asymmetrical power relations.
between the nation-states and the individual men and women who crossed, and therefore simultaneously defined and breached, the border.

Notes
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5 Among European migrants, as much as one in four of all arrivals into Canada


7 Ramirez with Otis, *Crossing the 49th Parallel*, 183.


10 Ramirez with Otis, *ibid.*, 41–44.


18 *Subject Correspondence, 1906–1931, Records of the U.S. Immigration and
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_Naturalization Service, Record Group 85, Washington, D.C._ (hereafter, referred to as _Subject Correspondence_), File 51931/5.


20 Department of Commerce and Labor, _Annual Report_, 1903, 44.

21 Immigration Act of March 3, 1903 (32 Statutes-at-Large), reaffirmed the Act of February 26, 1885 (23 Statutes-at-Large 332); Immigration Act of February 20, 1907 (34 Statutes-at-Large 898); U.S. Immigration Act of May 26, 1924 (43 Statutes-at-Large 153). In January 1923, the Government of Canada issued Order in Council excluding “any immigrant of any Asiatic race” except agriculturalists, farm labourers, female domestic servants, and wife and children of a person legally in Canada. September 1930, the Government of Canada issued Order in Council (P.C. 2115) prohibiting the landing of “any immigrant of any Asiatic race” except wives and minor children of Canadian citizens.


24 Ramirez with Otis, _Crossing the 49th Parallel_, 35–50.


26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., 16.

29 Ibid., 446–448. See also Ramirez with Otis, _Crossing the 49th Parallel_; Brookes, “The Golden Age and the Exodus,” 57–82; Widdis, _With Scarcely a Ripple_.

30 Ramirez with Otis, _Crossing the 49th Parallel_, 105.

31 Ibid.

32 _Reports of the Industrial Commission_, 446–447.

33 Ibid., 447.

34 Yukari Takai, “The Family Networks and Geographic Mobility of French-Canadian Immigrants in Early-Twentieth Century Lowell, Massachusetts,” _Journal of Family History_ 26, 3 (July 2001): 373–394, especially Table 2, 379.

35 _The Soundex Index to Canadian Border Entries through the St. Albans, Vermont,

Reports of the Industrial Commission, 446.

Ibid., 93.

Catherine Collomp, “Immigrants, Labor Markets, and the State, A Comparative Approach: France and the United States, 1880–1930,” Journal of American History 86, 1 (1999), 60. See also Ramirez with Otis, Crossing the 49th Parallel, 52–53, for agitation against Chinese and Japanese workers, as well as the occasional embrace expressed by unions, in earlier periods. See also Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues.

Breakdown is as follows: from January to June 1900, 1,341; from July 1900 to June 1901, 2,103; from July 1901 to June 1902, 1,336; from July 1902 to June 1903, 1,007; from July 1903 to June 1904, 3,551; from 1904 to June 1905, 1,713. Subject Correspondence, “Attitudes of Canada,” 51931/21.

Moriyama, Imin Gaisha, 152, nt. 43.

Subject Correspondence, 51686/17 av.


Reports of the Industrial Commission, 755.

Subject Correspondence, 51630/44f.

Border Entries, 224-097-K600.

Subject Correspondence, Takamoto Josaburo.

Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration (Ottawa 1902), 337.

Subject Correspondence, 51893/53.

Ibid., 51893/87.

Ibid., 518393/85.

Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans: An Interpretive History (Boston: Twayne, 1991), 107; Roger Daniels, Asian America: Chinese and Japanese in the United States Since 1850 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988), 146; Roger Daniels and Otis L.
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Graham, *Debating American Immigration, 1882 to Present* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publications, 2001), 9–10. This in turn radically transformed the hitherto society of “bachelor” sojourners into the immigrant communities comprised of women, men, and children.

52 To begin with, there were few Japanese women in North America, and miscegenation laws prohibited Japanese men from marrying white women. In addition, a return trip to Japan would cost not only more than most Japanese male labourers could afford, but would also have meant that they would lose their deferred military draft status from the Japanese government. Many thus resorted to writing to their relatives in Japan, asking for them to find a wife and send her to the United States. Such an arrangement was rooted in a common practice in Japan at the time—i.e., marriage by proxy—which was thus adapted to meet the needs of trans-Pacific migrants. This gave rise to the phenomenon of shashin kekkon, marriage by photographs, and the arrival of hundreds of brides. Yuji Ichikawa, *The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrants, 1885–1924* (New York: Free Press, 1988), especially chap. 5; Alice Yun Chai, “Picture Brides: Feminist Analysis of Life Histories of Hawai’i’s Early Immigrant Women from Japan, Okinawa, and Korea,” in *Seeking Common Ground: Multidisciplinary Studies of Immigrant Women in the United States*, ed. Donna Gabaccia (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992); Eileen Sunada Sarashon, *Issei Women: Echoes from Another Frontier* (Palo Alto: Pacific Books, 1998); Eithne Luibheid, *Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), chap. 3; Rumiko Masabuchi, “1910-Nendai no Hainichi to ‘Shashin Kekkon’,” (Anti-Japanese Sentiment during the 1910s and ‘Picture Marriage’) in *Japanizu Amerika: Iju kara Jiritsu eno Ayumi* (*Japanese America: The Path from Emigration to Independence*), ed. Soken Togami (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 1986); Kei Tanaka, “Japanese Picture Marriage in 1900–1924 California: Construction of Japanese Race and Gender” (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 2002).

53 *Reports of the Industrial Commission, 758.*


55 Takai, “The Family Networks and Geographic Mobility,” 387.


57 Although the Japanese emigration companies was influential in recruiting and shipping Japanese labourers to Hawai’i, according to Alan Moriyama, they played only a minor role in direct immigration to the United States. Alan T. Moriyama, *Imin
Gaisha.

58 Reports of the Industrial Commission, 755.
59 Ibid.
60 Subject Correspondence, 51893/53.
61 Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 4–5.