

Beyond Newton:

Samuel Clarke's Own Thought in *the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence*

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INTRODUCTION

Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) and Gottfried W. Leibniz (1646-1716) continued a controversy from 1715 to 1716 in epistolary exchanges five times each. *The Leibniz and Clarke Correspondence* (hereafter, *the Correspondence*) was frequently quoted by natural philosophers and theologians in the 18th century and is one of significant controversies in the history of science.

Many studies on *the Correspondence* can be roughly categorized into three. (1) Studies that show the differences in views of the two natural philosophers, ranging from "The Case of the Missing *Tanquam*: Leibniz, Newton & Clarke" by Alexandre Koyré and I. Bernard Cohen to "Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence" by D. Bertoloni Meli. (2) Studies that clarify the relation between their arguments and English society at that time from the historical viewpoint. Steven Shapin's "Of Gods and Kings: Natural Philosophy and Politics in the Leibniz-Clarke Disputes" is a pioneer work in this category. (3) Studies that focus on the specific philosophical problems such as the definitions of time and space, and associate them with modern physics. For example, Soushichi Uchii's *Kuukan no Nazo, Jikan no Nazo (The Mystery of Space and Time)* can fall into this category.

In those studies, there is a common supposition that Clarke's claim was regarded as the claim of Isaac Newton (1642-1727). In a word, Newton disguised himself as Clarke in *the Correspondence*. Although it seems to be certain that Newton supported Clarke in *the Correspondence* as Koyré and Cohen point out, Clarke wasn't mere

Newton's agent¹⁾. It is because Clarke developed his own view that Newton didn't.

The aim of this article is to clarify Clarke's original thought and reexamine his role in *the Correspondence*. In this article, I refer to Clarke's *The Works* as an original source in addition to *the Correspondence*.

Needed in advance to examine Clarke's own thought is the definition of "Newtonianism" which is one of crucial words in this article. Newtonianism has been broadly understood as an intellectual group that adhered to Newton's natural philosophical system but its definition has varied from individuals called Newtonians to their generations. In this article, Newtonianism can be regarded as early Newtonianism that rose from Glorious Revolution (1688-89) to the 1720's as Margaret C. Jacob defines²⁾.

Figure 1 shows the basic structure of this article.




Figure 1. The Structure of this Article

¹⁾ Alexandre Koyré and I. Bernard Cohen, "Newton & the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence with Notes on Newton, Conti, Des Maizeaux", *Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Science*, 15 (1962): 64-69. Mr. and Mrs. Hall prove Newton's involvement in *the Correspondence*, supporting the assertion of Koyré and Cohen. See A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall, "Note and Correspondence: Clarke and Newton", *Isis*, 52 (1961): 583-585. Furthermore, in Caroline's private letter to Leibniz with Clarke's second reply dated Jan. 2, 1716, she conveyed a message to Leibniz that Newton had involved in *the Correspondence*, mentioning, "they are not written without the advice of Chev. Newton". See H. G. Alexander ed., *The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence* (Manchester: Manchester U. P., 1956), p.193.

²⁾ Margaret C. Jacob, *The Newtonians and the English Revolution 1689-1720* (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1976), pp.15-21. Although Jacob points out in this book that early

1. Voluntarism and its Historical Context

The wide gulf between the two disputants' claims in *the Correspondence* can be the result of the difference between their perceptions of how God make a decision. Clarke insisted on voluntarism, while Leibniz did on intellectualism. Clarke highly respected God's will without any regulation. On the other hand, Leibniz strongly assumed that God decided how to act according to truths because the truths preexisted the divine volition.

1.1 Voluntarism and Intellectualism

Both of the two national philosophers regarded God as the ultimate agent, whereas they conflicted on the way of God's decision-making. According to Clarke, God brought about any event in space and intervened actively in the universe to preserve momentum. Moreover, the balance between matter and a vacuum, and the movement of matter in nature depended ultimately on the divine will. Clarke often detailed in his replies of *the Correspondence* that the movement was a result of the God's action, however it was consistent with natural laws or brought by miracles. God caused the movement of matter following His will alone³⁾. On the other hand, Leibniz's God arranged matter and power in the best way following "the principle of sufficient reason" at the very first moment, and sat by and saw the world in which matter began to move spontaneously. God located matter properly in space and gave it movement seen as an apple dropped by gravity. All the phenomena in nature could

Newtonianism recommended people to pursue worldly benefit, some researchers criticize her insistence for an inappropriate procedure in the demonstration or jumping to the conclusion theoretically. See Shinichi Nagao, *Newton-shyugi to Scotland Keimou (The Newtonianism and the Scotland Enlightenment)*, (Nagoya: Nagoya U.P., 2001), p.15. Many researchers still admit that early Newtonianism had a strong political flavor, aiming at the unity between Newton's natural philosophical structure and the political world in the 18th century England.

³⁾ Clarke referred to the divine will for the first time in his second reply. Alexander, *op. cit.*, (1), p. 21(Clarke's second reply, the first verse). Hereafter, as to the abbreviation of the letters and verses in *the Correspondence*, "Clarke's second reply, the first verse" is, for example, written as "C II , 1". Clarke focused on the divine will that could be sufficient reason at the first part of *the Correspondence*, and then shifted the focal point to the relation between the divine will and God's action in nature.

be explained theoretically because God programmed a principle in matter to get into motion spontaneously and designed the natural world to work mechanically. Such a contrast seen in their theological views have been understood as a dichotomy, “Newton: voluntarism, Leibniz: intellectualism”.

Newton manifested his own voluntarism in “General Scholium” of *Principia*, stating “All that diversity of natural things which we find suited to different times and places could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing”⁴⁾. Therefore, intervening in nature to mend the orbit of a planet and retain its motion, for instance, was determined by the divine will. In Newton's view, God could either retain regular movements in nature or interrupt the movements with the revision of natural laws. Whether activities in nature could be kept or interrupted depended on the divine will. Newton refused to explain nature by means of mere the mechanical principle because he took the divine will, which was never mechanical, into account for the explanation for nature.

Clarke's assertion against Leibniz in *the Correspondence* deeply reflected Newton's voluntarism seen as below.

...the wisdom of God consists, in framing originally the perfect and complete idea of a work, which begun and continues, according to that original perfect idea, by the continual uninterrupted exercise of his power and government⁵⁾.

In the response to that, Leibniz emphasized the rational divine wisdom as follows:

I have sufficiently insisted, that the creation wants to be continually influence'd [sic] by its creator. But I maintain it to be a watch, that goes without wanting to be mended by him: otherwise we must say, that God bethinks himself again. No; God

⁴⁾ Isaac Newton, Andrew Motte tr., *The Principia* (London: 1729, rep: NY: Prometheus Books, 1995), p. 442.

⁵⁾ Alexander, *op. cit.*, (1), p.22 (C II , 6-7).

has foreseen every thing; he has provided a remedy for every thing before-hand; there is in his works a harmony, a beauty, already pre-established⁶⁾.

In Leibniz's view, God influenced nature by means of predicting a state of the world after the Creation and taking measures against irregular phenomena there. To simplify such a divine character, Leibniz called God as "the efficient and exemplary cause" of things⁷⁾. In this regard, J. H. Brooke, a science historian, points out as follows:

For Clarke this [what the universe had been fixed] meant that cyclical disorders and renovations were all part of God's original design, but for Leibniz it meant that there was no room for cycles, disorders, and renovations⁸⁾. (I complemented words in the bracket. Hereafter, the same meaning shall apply.)

Brooke's analysis makes clear the difference of the two disputants' understanding of "the design of the world" which God had made just before the Creation.

Clarke acknowledged God's plan of the world but pointed up God's active intervening in nature for carrying out the plan. Meanwhile, Leibniz admired the divine wisdom to foresee future events and emphasized "predetermined harmony" given by the wisdom. The divine wisdom could make the world without any deviation.

1.2 Voluntarism and English Empiricism

Voluntarists traditionally had believed that human beings were able to understand Providence through only their experiences because all the things in nature depended on the divine will and human beings couldn't realize the will sufficiently. As to the connection between voluntarism and empiricism, R. Hooykaas points out, "the methodological controversy in science led to a victory of rational empiricism

⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, p.18(L II , 8).

⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, p.84(L V , 87).

⁸⁾ John H. Brooke, *Natural Theology in Britain from Boyle to Paley* in R. Hooykaas et al., *Science and Belief: from Copernicus to Darwin* (Open U.P., 1974), p.26.

over rationalism, and that the former found a support in voluntaristic theology”⁹⁾. Consequently, voluntarism needed empiricism in natural philosophy in early-modern Europe.

In the 16-18th century England, natural philosophers supposed empiricism as a basis of natural philosophy and adopted it to clarify nature. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and René Descartes (1596-1650) had significant influence on that intellectual framework of England. Bacon criticized Greek philosophers who had put too much emphasis on rationalism, and urged to collect “facts” in nature as many as possible to compile “natural history”. Human beings should make gradual progress toward truths through the empirical approach. Bacon was concerned that rationalism, which deduced from a hypothesis to discrete facts, was dangerous to lead human beings into errors.

Descartes stuck to rationalism in natural philosophy but kept his ground for voluntarism in theology. In Descartes' view, Providence in nature could be so changeable that the sum of the internal angles of a triangle, for example, might not be two right angles. Even so, the ability to sense anything in the world as truths was gifted to human beings by God. In natural philosophy, however, Descartes insisted on a *a priori* theory like “the law of conservation of momentum” that was inconsistent with empiricism. P. Harrison points out, “the French philosopher [Descartes] was both a rational voluntarist, and at the same time famously committed to the possibility of *a priori* knowledge of the laws of nature”¹⁰⁾. Even though Descartes was a rationalist, it was certain that his natural philosophy could be readily accepted in the country of empiricism in terms of identifying the divine will with the ultimate agent.

Given the tradition of English empiricism mentioned above, it was natural

⁹⁾ R. Hooykaas, *Religion and the Rise of Modern Science* (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2000), p. 51. See also, Nagao, *op. cit.*, (2), pp.92-104. Moreover, Yoshimoto examines the difference between Newton's concept of God and Leibniz's, quoting the formula, “voluntarism: empiricism, intellectualism: rationalism”. See, Hideyuki Yoshimoto, “Newton to Leibniz”, *Iwanami Kouza: Shyukyo to Kagaku*, (“Newton and Leibniz”, *Iwanami Course: Religion and Science*) vol.2 (1993): 213-239. In the first chapter, Yoshimoto briefly stated the intellectual context on empiricism and rationalism in the 17th century, referring to *the Correspondence*.

¹⁰⁾ Peter Harrison, “Voluntarism and Early Modern Science”, *History of Science*, 40 (2002): 65.

that Newton succeeded to it. He aimed at clarifying Providence in nature through empiricism, emphasizing effectiveness of “experiments and observations” in “Query 31” of *Opticks* as follows:

As in mathematicks [sic], so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of difficult Things by the Method of Composition. This Analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing general Conclusion from them by Induction, but such as are taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths¹¹⁾.

Newtonians including Clarke took over consequently Newton's empirical method. They were assured that induction through experiments and observations was the best way to unfold the system of nature and to find Providence. Meanwhile, Newtonians conceded the limit of empiricism. For them, it was impossible to gather facts unlimitedly through experiments and observations and grasp all of truths in nature. Nagao points out that Newtonians considered a perfect grasp of nature impossible because God's intervention was based on the divine will; accordingly Newtonians' voluntarism was a thinking method that experience was considered as the sole clue to find truths¹²⁾.

Newton was once criticized for attributing the cause of gravity to “occult quality”. Colin MacLaurin (1698-1746), a Newtonian and a Scottish mathematician, defended Newton, mentioning the criticism rather proved that human intelligence couldn't understand all of nature. MacLaurin suggested that the difficulty to clarify the cause of gravity was due to not a fault in Newton's gravitational concept but the limit of human intellect¹³⁾. For Newtonians, rational approach that attempted to grasp the whole world *a priori* was “conceited”, while empirical approach that could elucidate truths in nature step by step was “modest”.

¹¹⁾ Isaac Newton, *Optics* (London: 1730, rep: NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), p.404.

¹²⁾ Nagao, *op. cit.*, (2), pp.96-97.

¹³⁾ *Ibid.*, pp.96-97.

As stated above, empiricism in England was efficient to bring out Providence in the sphere of natural philosophy and significant to find the divine work in nature in the sphere of theology. In this intellectual current in England, Clarke naturally developed assertions in which empiricism was a keynote.

2. Views on the Divine Will

The nucleus of intellectualism which Leibniz supposed in *the Correspondence* was “the principle of sufficient reason”. In Leibniz's view, even God made a decision according to that principle. Clarke, on the other hand, underscored the divine will without any restraint and insisted that the divine will could be equivalent to sufficient reason. In *the Correspondence*, he accused Leibniz's divine concept based on that principle of degrading the divine dignity or even leading to atheism.

2.1 The Principle of Sufficient Reason

In *the Correspondence*, Leibniz showed two fundamental principles to demonstrate problems that he proposed in his first letter. One was “the principle of contradiction” that was a mathematical principle known as “A is A, and cannot be not A”. The other was “the principle of sufficient reason” that was a principle found in nature meaning “nothing happens without a reason why it should be so, rather than otherwise”¹⁴⁾.

In *the Correspondence*, Clarke also admitted the principle of sufficient reason but identified the principle with the divine will *per se*, claiming “in things in their own nature indifferent; mere will, without any thing external to influence it, is alone that sufficient reason”¹⁵⁾. Therefore, Clarke contradicted the principle because if the divine will was decided by sufficient reason, “this would tend to take away all power of choosing, and to introduce fatality”¹⁶⁾.

Nevertheless, identifying the principle with the divine will, as Clarke asserted, was opposed to Leibniz's philosophy. Leibniz thought there couldn't be “an indifferent

¹⁴⁾ Alexander, *op. cit.*, (1), pp.15-16 (L II , 1).

¹⁵⁾ *Ibid.*, p.30(C III , 2).

¹⁶⁾ *Ibid.*, p.21(C II , 1).

choice” without the reason and insisted in *Essais de Théodicée* (Hereafter, *Théodicée*) that human beings who seemingly moved their bodies unconsciously had reasons to do so. The following is his explanation for that.

...there is never any *indifference of equipoise*, that is, where all is completely even on both sides, without any inclination towards either. Innumerable great and small movements, internal and external, co-operate with us, for the most part unperceived by us. And I have already said that when one leaves a room there are such and such reasons determining us to put the one foot first, without pausing to reflect¹⁷⁾.

Furthermore, in *the Correspondence*, when Clarke insisted that the principle of sufficient reason deprived God of choice, Leibniz objected, “I maintain that God has the power of choosing, since I ground that power upon the reason of a choice agreeable his wisdom”¹⁸⁾. Leibniz assured himself of God's voluntariness which wasn't incompatible with the principle of sufficient reason.

Leibniz focused on the principle of sufficient reason particularly in the argument on the concept of space in *the Correspondence*. He rejected absolute space but supposed relative space. Given absolute space, Leibniz supposed, the reason why a thing lay “at the point” couldn't be found, even though the reason should be needed. In relative space, such a question was nonsense because of the absence of the concept of “specific place”. The only reason why things lay “with the relation” should be satisfied in relative space. The principle of sufficient reason was adopted by Leibniz to both justify relative space and decline absolute space.

In addition to the principle of sufficient reason in *the Correspondence*, Leibniz claimed another philosophical principle to reinforce the concept of relative space, “the

¹⁷⁾ Gottfried W. Leibniz, E. M. Huggard tr., *Theodicy* (Amsterdam: 1710, rep: OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2001), pp. 148-149.

¹⁸⁾ Alexander, *op. cit.*, (1), p.27 (L III , 8).

principle of the identity of indiscernible”. That principle means, “there is no such two things in nature that can be discerned”. Leibniz supposed two cases of the same thing laid in two different ways respectively and explained the principle of the identity of indiscernible as follows:

Their difference therefore is only to be found in our chimerical supposition of the reality of space in itself. But in truth the one would exactly be the same thing as the other, they being absolutely indiscernible;¹⁹⁾

In his view, the principle can be replaced by a proposition, “two things that can't be discerned no matter what means are one and the same” because God couldn't find the sufficient reason in different ways for completely the same two things. Therefore, the principle of the identity of indiscernible can be understood as a descendent version from the principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz thought that neither one universe *before* movement nor the other *after* the movement could be discerned, thus they were not the same universe. It was why Leibniz rejected Clarke's thought experiment in which the universe could move in space.

2.2 Fatalism and Free Will

Through Clarke's philosophical career, his adversaries as to free will were fatalists. They professed “determinism” which focused on evaluative judgment preceding decision-making. For Clarke, representatives of fatalists were natural philosophers one generation ago, such as Baruch de Spinoza (1632-77) on the Continent and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in England. In the Boyle lectures, Clarke entitled *More particularly in Answer to Mr. Hobbes, Spinoza, and their Followers* as the subtitle of *A Demonstration of the Being and Attribute of God* and attempted to refute Spinoza and Hobbes. The causal relationship based on a formula, “the reason is equivalent to the cause” was characteristic of the worldview of Spinoza and Hobbs, but Clarke “believed in a strong version of agent causation in which the agent is the sole cause of volition

¹⁹⁾ *Ibid.*, p.26 (LIII, 5).

and regarded the cause as the will of an agent who judge”²⁰⁾.

So far as the divine volition was concerned, Leibniz's theory on volition was close to Spinoza's in terms of that he based volition on the sufficient reason and made God more reasonable. In Spinoza's view, God made his own decision but the decision depended on the sufficient reason. Clarke criticized Spinoza for identifying God with “a necessary agent” and showed two reasons to decline Spinoza's viewpoint²¹⁾. First, a proposition, “God is necessary”, was a contradicted statement because He acted in nature without any restriction. Secondly, if, as Spinoza claimed, the divine operation were necessary, it would produce nothing but a monotonous world. Nevertheless, the truth was so much diversity in the world.

In *the Correspondence*, Clarke criticized Leibniz for making God a necessary agent or imperfect God who doesn't have choice, yet Leibniz recognized the divine free choice, mentioning that God just choose the best among many options even though God could choose any. He stated his view on the divine choice in *Théodicée* as follows:

God fails not to choose the best, but he is not constrained so to do: nay, more, there is no necessity in the object of God's choice, for another sequence of things is equally possible. For that very reason the choice is free and independent of necessity, because it is made between several possibles, and the will is determined only by the preponderating goodness of the object²²⁾.

The notion that Leibniz claimed over the divine choice in *Théodicée* was shown in *the Correspondence* as well. Leibniz protested that the divine necessity wasn't conflicted with the divine will and categorized necessity into four kinds: (1)

²⁰⁾ Ezio Vailati, *Leibniz & Clarke, A Study of Their Correspondence* (NY: Oxford U.P., 1997), p.84.

²¹⁾ *Ibid.*, pp.81-82. Vailati sums up what Clarke criticized Spinoza at Clarke's Boyle lecture entitled “A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God”. The original contents can be seen in Samuel Clarke, “A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God” in *The Works*, vol. II (London: 1738, rep: NY: Garland Publishing, 1978), p.566, p.540 and p.549.

²²⁾ Leibniz, *op. cit.*, (17), p.148.

absolute necessity, (2) hypothetical necessity, (3) logical-metaphysical-mathematical necessity and (4) moral necessity. Hypothetical necessity and moral necessity could be compatible with the divine free choice. Among others, Leibniz admired moral necessity because it was the evidence of God's reason which could choose the best among possible worlds. In *the Correspondence*, Leibniz examined the relationship between moral necessity and God's freedom as follows:

As for moral necessity, this also does not derogate from liberty. For when a wise being, and especially God, who has supreme wisdom, chooses what is best, he is not the less free upon that account: on the contrary, it is the most perfect liberty, not to be hindered from acting in the best manner²³⁾.

According to Leibniz's theory on necessity, although God could choose the best option without any obstacle, the decision was done based on reason that belonged in God.

Clarke also admitted moral necessity, but his interpretation of it was different from Leibniz's. In the Boyle lectures, Clarke defined moral necessity as:

'Tis evident He must of necessity, (meaning, not a Necessity of Fate, but such a Moral Necessity as I before said was consistent with the most perfect Liberty,) Do always what he Knows to be Fittest to be done; That is, He must act always according to the strictest Rules of Infinite Goodness, Justice, and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections²⁴⁾.

In Clarke's moral necessity, God didn't necessarily make a moral judgment according to the due reason because the judgment in itself was moral. Clarke mentioned the process of the divine volition in *the Correspondence* as stated below.

²³⁾ Alexander, *op. cit.*, (1), p.56 (L V , 7).

²⁴⁾ Clarke, "A Demonstration of the Being and Attribute of God" , *op. cit.*, (21), p.572.

The motive, or thing considered as in view, is something extrinsic to the mind: the impression made upon the mind by that motive, is the perceptive quality, in which the mind is passive: the doing any thing, upon and after, or in consequence of, that perception; this is the power of self-motion or action:

Whether an agent's mind was passive or active, Clarke stressed, "the immediate physical cause or principle of action be indeed in him whom we call the agent"²⁵⁾. Clarke's God could control any principle to make a decision and thus had more freedom than Leibniz's God.

3. Clarke's Thought

In Clarke's last reply of *the Correspondence*, he disclosed his own thought related to free will inherited from Newton's voluntarism. The essence of his thought was that human beings had, if qualified, as much authority to control matter in nature as God had. Clarke's own thought expanded the range of an argument in *the Correspondence* from God to human beings or from the natural world to human society.

3.1 Clarke's Original Claim in *the Correspondence*

In *the Correspondence*, Clarke manifested his original thought in the objection to Leibniz's mechanical interpretation, in particular, on how God predicted the use of human free will and adjusted any thing in the world to synchronize human behavior²⁶⁾. That is seen in the verse 110 to 116 in Clarke's last reply. The following is a typical refutation to Leibniz's mechanical interpretation.

²⁵⁾ Alexander, *op. cit.*, (1), pp.97-99 (C V , 1-20). In Clarke's assertion, it may be possible to understand that spirit acts necessarily because the spirit succeed to motive. In fact, Clarke was criticized by some natural philosophers in this point. Load Kames (Henry Hume)(1696-1782) supported Clarke, mentioning that you didn't have a sense of necessity because to act necessarily was to act according to one's motive. See, Nagao, *op. cit.*, (2), pp.262-263.

²⁶⁾ To be exact, Leibniz insisted, "...God, foreseeing what the free cause would do, did from the beginning regulate the machine in such manner, that it cannot fail to agree with that free cause". Alexander, *op. cit.*, (1), pp.85-86 (L V , 32). Clarke regarded "free cause" in this verse as human beings and understood that human free will was excluded in Leibniz's "predetermined harmony".

Or is it credible, that when a man has it in his power to resolve and know a month before-hand, what he will do upon such a particular day or hour to come; is it credible, I say, that his body shall by the mere power of mechanism, impressed originally upon the material universe at its creation, punctually conform itself to the resolutions of the man's mind at the time appointed?

In addition, Clarke quoted human spontaneous act as counter-evidence against Leibniz's predetermined harmony as follows:

[People who interpret anything mechanically have to explain] how the infinitely various spontaneous motions of animals and men, are performed. Which, I am fully persuaded, is as impossible to make out, as it would be to show how a house or city could be built, or the world itself have been at first formed by mere mechanism, without any intelligent and active cause²⁷⁾.

For Clarke, human spontaneous act was nothing but a result of the exercise of human free will. Through daily experiences, Clarke believed, authority to use free will was given to human beings, even though it was difficult to find the reliable evidence. As with human free will, Clarke criticized Henry Dodwell (1641-1711), an English theologian, in a letter with the reduction of absurdity as follows:

[As Mr. Dodwell insists] If the Mind of Man, were nothing but a certain System of Matter; and Thinking, nothing but a certain Mode of Motion in that System: It would follow, that, since every Determination of Motion depends necessary upon the impulse that causes it, therefore every Thought in a Man's Mind must likewise be necessary, and depending wholly upon external Cause; And there could be no such thing in Us, as Liberty, or a Power of Self-determination²⁸⁾.

²⁷⁾ *Ibid.*, p.117 (CV , 110-116).

²⁸⁾ Samuel Clarke, "A Third Defense of an Argument made use of in a Letter to Mr. Dodwell, to

For Clarke, Dodwell was also a necessarian who didn't admit human free will. In Dodwell's view, a state of mind was determined by a physical cause since the mind was subjected to matter.

In the Boyle lectures, Clarke gave more detailed comment on human voluntariness. He stated it as written below, interpreting human beings into "created intelligent beings".

So that all those things which we commonly say are the Effects of the Natural Powers of Matter [seen in matter's movement or stillness], and Laws of Motion; of Gravitation, Attraction, or the like; are indeed (if we will speak strictly and properly) the Effects of God's acting upon Matter continually and every moment, either immediately by himself, or mediately by some created intelligent Beings:

Furthermore, He continued the explanation of human ability which, if within a certain range, could control matter in nature by their will.

And if, (as seems most probable,) this continual Acting upon Matter, be performed by the subserviency of created Intelligences appointed to that purpose by the Supreme Creator; then 'tis as easy for any of Them, and as much within their natural Power, (by the Permission of God,) to alter the Course of Nature at any time, or in any respect, as to preserve or continue it²⁹.

Clarke's claim in the Boyle lectures considered, his own thought in *the Correspondence* can be thought that the divine authority to intervene in nature was transferred to human beings.

prove the immateriality and Natural Immortality of the Soul", *A Letter to Mr. Dodwell 5th ed.* (London: 1718), p.194.

²⁹ Clarke, "A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation", *op. cit.*, (21), pp. 697-698.

3.2 Clarke's Voluntarism

Because Clarke was Newton's disciple as well as a prominent theologian, he earned considerable reputation among Newtonians. Therefore, his original thought in *the Correspondence* assumed a social feature that was consistent to the purpose of Newtonianism.

In the Boyle lectures, Clarke advocated a social model based on Newton's natural philosophy to pursue social order with authority given by God to control matter in nature. It was because he was certain of "This power, his free will, gives man a mandate to manipulate material things, to engage in commerce, to conduct affairs of state" as the divine will had been keeping natural order³⁰⁾. For Clarke, manipulating matter in nature linked with a social reform. In *the Correspondence*, Clarke's own thought directly meant involvement in nature by human free will but indirectly his desire for the social reform achieved through human reason.

For Newtonians, human beings should conduct themselves in line with Providence hidden in nature. In other words, "nature" should be a model of "society" and to clarify Providence in nature, which Newton aimed at eagerly, could become a pillar to form ideal society. A preliminary task to realize those subjects was to promote the systematization of Newton's natural philosophy rigidly. Clarke, one of a few Newtonians who could properly understand Newton's natural philosophy, made a point of such a Newtonian strategy particularly.

To be more precise, Clarke devoted his effort to establishing the concept of matter. If, he thought, matter was passive, only God and human beings could control matter completely, so that the order of both nature and society could be kept. This kind of logic reinforced a premise, "only if matter were inanimate could free will be unambiguously attributed to God and man"³¹⁾. Clarke used the logic as an efficient objection against Leibniz and domestic freethinkers such as Dodewll, Anthony Collins

³⁰⁾ Jacob, *op. cit.*, (2), p.199.

³¹⁾ Steven Shapin, "Of Gods and Kings: Natural Philosophy and Politics in the Leibniz-Clarke Disputes", *Isis*, 72 (1981): 210.

(1676-1729) and John Toland (1670-1722) who all supported hylozoism of which center was a life principle in matter.

Clarke mentioned that the divine authority was transferred to human beings. On the other hand, he put emphasis on the rational exercise of human free will because he admitted that human beings couldn't have the same ability to use their free will as God could exercise His will. He was afraid that human beings erred in the proper use of their free will due to their lust. Steven Shapin, a science historian, points out that the social context of post-Glorious Revolution affected Clarke's thought³²⁾. According to Shapin, raising a public tendency to require democracy after Glorious Revolution petitioned restraint on the throne for Parliament and civic rights to protest against the monarch. Clarke was one of them who watched for the abuse of the throne and were anxious about social disorder caused by the indifferent use of human free will. In the Boyle lectures, he warned the attendance as follows:

All Inanimate and all Irrational Beings, by the Necessity of their Nature, constantly obey the Laws of their Creation; and tend regularly to the Ends, for which they were appointed. How monstrous then is it, that Reasonable Creatures, merely because they are not Necessitated, should abuse that glorious privilege of Liberty, by which they are exalted in dignity above the rest of God's Creation, to make themselves the alone Unreasonable and disorderly part of the Universe³³⁾.

For Clarke, the use of human "free" will might brought about anarchy in society because human beings were imperfect. The resort to evade the crisis was to accord with Providence in nature and follow intrinsic reason in human mind. Clarke mentioned it in

³²⁾ The Whigs opposed the Tories which agreed to giving totally the throne to Mary 2nd and William 3rd after Glorious Revolution. Among the Whigs, Court Whig to which Clarke belonged tried to enact laws to regulate the throne. As to the relations between Clarke's thought and the then political and social context, See *ibid.*: 197-215.

³³⁾ Clarke, "A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation", *op. cit.*, (21), p.619.

the Boyle lectures as follows:

'Tis evident every Man is bound by the Law of his Nature, and as he is also promoted by the Inclination of his uncorrupted Affections, to look upon himself as a part and member of that one universal body or community, which is made up of all Mankind;³⁴⁾

Clarke claimed that human beings should exercise their free will following "laws of nature" which was resident in them. Therefore, human freedom shouldn't be indifferent but needed to follow the reasonable law in human mind, namely "reason". In *the Correspondence*, Clarke gave a more detail explanation where he combined reason and freedom and distinguished freedom from voluntariness as follows:

...the doing of any thing, upon and after, or in consequence of, that perception; this is the power of self-motion or action: which in all animate agents, is spontaneity; and, in moral agents, is what we properly call liberty³⁵⁾.

Clarke suggested that if freedom were given to human beings, they must be ethical agents.

CONCLUSION

The major cause why the two disputants didn't have no common ground until the very end of *the Correspondence* can be ascribed to the difference of their divine concepts. Clarke was premised on voluntarism and argued against Leibniz with it. His voluntarism was inherited from Newton.

Nevertheless, Clarke added his original thought to Newton's voluntarism in his fifth replay of *the Correspondence*. That was shown as a refutation against Leibniz's

³⁴⁾ *Ibid.*, p.622.

³⁵⁾ Alexander, *op. cit.*, (1), p.97 (CV, 1-20).

mechanical view. Clarke stressed that the divine foresight contradicted human spontaneous behavior. In Clarke's view, if God could foresee anything in the future, any human behavior should be determined in advance and there would be no room for human free will. In the Boyle lectures, Clarke had already referred to his voluntaristic thought. He mentioned that human beings were able to control matter in nature because they were given as much authority as God exercised His will to control nature. Margaret Jacob points out that Clarke's own thought as to human free will could function as a crucial factor to aim at ordered society in the 18th century England³⁶. As far as her examination is concerned, it is certain that Clarke's own thought was consistent with the interest of Newtonianism that attempted to apply "harmony in nature" to "social order".

From mentioned above, another interpretation of Clarke's roll besides Newton's agent in *the Correspondence* can be shown. Clarke not only reiterated Newton's thought but expanded it. His originality was in the voluntaristic thought that applied the divine authority to control nature to human beings. Clarke regarded human free will as an extension of the divine will and believed that both human and the divine volition were done through the same process. In *the Correspondence*, Clarke was more than Newton's agent in the sense that he added his original thought to Newton's voluntarism.

As long as human beings needed reasonable restraint on their free will, however, Clarke differentiated human free will from the divine will. Clarke was convinced that human volition was rationally available on a certain condition. That is to say, human beings must exercise their free will in accord with Providence in nature and restraint their will through their inherent reason because they couldn't be perfect unlike God. Clarke had already stated his voluntaristic thought in his Boyle lecture in 1705. In the lecture, Clarke underlined that laws of nature in human mind were precedent to their volition and thus human beings must exercise their free will following moral canons. Hence, his voluntaristic thought applied to human beings was restrictive.

The Correspondence ended with Clarke's fifth reply but brought a possibility to

³⁶ Jacob, *op. cit.*, (2), p.167 and p.199.

expand the range of an argument from “the divine nature” to “human society”. If *the Correspondence* had continued after Clarke's fifth reply, it would have been “literally” *the Leibniz and Clarke Correspondence*.